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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON KOREAN NGOS' FINANCIAL & HUMAN 
RESOURCES
By
Byung-Ok Park
    The three essays presented in this dissertation aim to investigate the 
state of Korean NGOs' financial and human resources and its change, and to 
research into some important issues relevant to it.
Chapter 1. NGO's Financing & The Effects of Government's Financial 
           Support on Them.
    The first essay investigates factors influencing on the amount of their 
private donation, and the effects of government's financial support to NGOs 
on the amount of their private donation, using the panel data of 120 Korean 
NGOs in 2002 and 81 in 2005. The results shows that the number of a 
NGO's membership and full-time workers have positive effects on the 
amount of its private donation, and their influence had increased during the 
period. What is noticeable is the effect of the number of media reports on a 
NGO, which had positive effects on the amount of its private donation in 
2002 but didn't show significant effect any more in 2005. And, the 
government's financial support to NGOs was proved to have 'crowd-out' 
effects on the amount of their private donation, especially, membership fees. 
Chapter 2. Wage Determinants of Korean NGO-Workers
    The second essay examines what factors influence the wage level of 
Korean NGO-workers, using the panel data of 120 Korean NGOs in 2002 
and 81 in 2005 and the data of 344 workers in 2002 and 244 in 2005 who 
were working for the NGOs surveyed. The wage level of NGO-workers was 
just about 50% of that of for-profit workers, and the wage gap had not 
decreased during the investigation period. The results of regression analysis 
shows that wage determinants had been changed in the period. Variables of 
Marriage and Status that shows positive effect in 2002 doesn't show 
significant effect in 2005. A variable of Tenure that doesn't have significant 
in 2002 shows positive effect in 2005. Concerning organization-related 
variables, variables of a Service-provider NGO and a NGO in Seoul or 
metropolitan cities show positive effect in 2002, but doesn't show significant 
effect in 2005 in case of controlling a variable of a NGO's total annual 
revenue. Influence of a 'total annual' variable on workers' wage level almost 
doubled during the period. What is the most interesting is that the amount 
of a NGO's membership fees and its ratio to total annual revenue have 
positive effect on worker's wage level, while government's financial support 
to a NGO has no significant effect on it, in both years. 
Chapter 3. Factors Influencing The Increasing Rate of NGO's Membership
    The last essay investigates the state of NGO's human resources such as 
membership and full-time workers, and factors influencing their growth. In 
case of advocacy NGOs, as the size of city where a NGO is located is 
bigger and as it has more membership and as its annual revenue is smaller, 
the increasing rate of membership is shown to be lower. The increasing 
rate of a NGO's full-time workers shows similar figures. It is shown to be 
lower as the size of city where a NGO is located is bigger and as it has 
more workers. The result of analysis shows that the amount of annual 
revenue, especially, membership fees have positive effect on the increasing 
rate of membership while the amount of existing membership has negative 
effect on it. 
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CHAPTER 1
NGO'S FINANCING & THE EFFECTS OF 
GOVERNMENT'S FINANCIAL SUPPORT 
Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION
1. The Purpose of the Study and Background
     In the early stage of citizens' movement, majority of revenue of NGOs 
came from private donations such as membership fee and fundraising.1)  
Since the mid-1990s, NGOs have made efforts to diversify their financial 
resources. Research project from companies and government (including local 
government) appeared as one of main funding sources, and various 
cause-related business programs have been started. However, the increasing 
projects had a limited number of human resources assigned and diluted the 
real purpose of NGOs. And Most of business programs had not brought 
revenue as much as they expected because of restricted business items, 
limited financial resource and personnel necessary to manage the programs. 
    Law on Supporting Non-profit organization, established and implemented 
in 2000, carried great significance in that it recognized publicity of NGOs’ 
activities and based the legal justification of their need for support. Also the 
law was a very turning point because the law was initiated not by the 
government but by continuous efforts of NGOs. Afterwards, the law, 
however, lost its significance because of criticism against NGOs to be 
supported by government and political debate on the issue. The 
1) Membership fee is the revenue that members registered with a NGO pay regularly, while fundraising 
revenue means the donation from individual or corporate donors who are not registered as members. 
private donation is composed of membership fee and fundraising revenue.
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conservative political party and mass media took issues with NGOs that 
were financed by the government saying that they were "government-run 
NGOs." After having gone through this process, NGOs in Korea generally 
have three ways to finance themselves: from individual or corporate 
donations; from service provisions through research projects, business 
programs and advertising orders from companies, from government's 
financial support. 
     As Korea has seen the number of NGOs and their influences on 
society grow, the public has paid more attention to finance and operation of 
NGOs. However, compared to the level of the interest, it was hard to find 
theoretical and researches on the matter. So far, this social concern and 
debate over this matter has been focused only on "validity of government 
support and corporation support to NGOs."  In particular, in line with 
political situation over the recent years, the government’s support for NGOs 
has brought conflicting opinions: some argue the government has to 
financially support the groups because their activity is for the public benefit  
and the donation culture has not been established in Korean society yet; 
while others say the NGO’s role of monitoring the government policy will be 
compromised due to the support. Every time this issue was brought up, the 
question, "what are desirable and feasible alternatives for NGO's financing?", 
arose, but always ended by emphasizing the importance of membership fee 
at a fundamental and abstract level. 
    A lack of the researches and social debates over the finance of NGOs 
are attributed to: first, objective data and scientific results of their finance 
is rare and; second, the objectivity lacks because of politically or 
ideologically motivated approaches. 
     The purpose of this research is to provide an objective data on 
financial state and its change and to draw useful policy implications to be 
necessary for NGO's sound and sustainable development through scientific 
analysis. To this end, I will try to find the answers to the following 
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questions based on this research. 
    First, how are the financial state and its change of NGOs? Secondly, 
what differences do NGOs show in terms of financial state and its change 
according to their characteristics? Thirdly, how does the government 
support affect the financial state and its change of NGOs? Fourth, assuming 
the society reached a conclusion that private donation coming from 
membership fee and fundraising is the best way for NGOs, what factors 
affect the amount of private donations? Fifth, What effect does the 
government support have on the amount of private donation? Is it crowd-out 
effect or crowd-in effect?
2. Research Method and Frame
    This research first analyzed the existing theoretical and empirical 
literatures on private donation of and government subsidy to non-profit 
organization. As for domestic literatures, research outcomes conducted by 
Park, Tae-gyoo and Jung, Young-seok (2001) and by Kang, Sang-wook 
(2002) have been reviewed and articles published in international magazines 
as for overseas literatures. Through these surveys, I came to understand 
"who" and "why" donate to non-profit organizations and what affects the 
donating act and the level, and in particular how the government’s financial 
support influences the private donation. Meanwhile, previous studies on 
private donation were all about the cause of donation and other factors that 
affect the donation and the level in terms of individual donor. Therefore, 
they were somewhat different from the topic that I intend to develop: what 
kind of characteristic of a NGO makes a donor contribute to a NGO? 
Furthermore, non-profit groups (NPOs), subject to previous researches and 
studies, take a form of service provider, i.e. commonly titled as social 
welfare organization or volunteer groups. As a consequence, I have failed to 
find a single study case on advocacy organization I planned to analyze in 
this study. 
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    For an empirical analysis on NGOs' human resource management,  the same 
nationwide field survey was conducted in 120 organizations and their workers 
twice. They belong to Solidarity Network, a representative network of Korea's 
NGOs. 
     The first survey on the state of NGOs and their workers in 2002 was 
conducted from March to April  of 2003.2) The survey on organizations was 
carried out through interviews with managers of the organizations. 120 
organizations replied to the questionnaires. The second survey on the state of 
NGOs and their workers in 2005 conducted from June to July of 2006, was 
carried out through interviews, e-mails and telephones with mangers of the 
organizations. Among 120 organizations, 81 organizations replied to the second 
questionnaires. 
     Even though there are many definitions and classification of NGO in 
the previous literatures, the concept of NGO varies depending on a 
country’s history and social background. A rigid definition of NGO is not the 
subject I want to argue here, so I will just introduce two types of NGO that 
have qualitatively different characteristics, and are main objects of the 
study. NGOs subject to this study are generally divided into two: First, a 
group who is committed to advocating interest of the socially weak or any 
citizens who are underestimated in society; Second, a group whose primary 
job is to produce and provide services that citizens need and whose 
secondary commitment is to advocate about the service-related issues. 
Those who do not or rarely go for the first group are categorized as a 
welfare organization while those who go for the second group are labeled 
as civil society organization. This study will label the first group as a 
advocacy group and the latter as a service group for the sake of 
convenience. The difference between two groups is, also, shown in the way 
of their financing. Generally advocacy group seek for revenues mainly in a 
form of donation while the service group primarily or exclusively are reliant 
2) This survey was carried out by Yoon Soonchul(2003). 
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on sales of product and service. Hansmann3) divided these two groups into 
"donative"group for the former and "commercial group" for the latter. 
     The content of the paper is as follows: In Chapter 2, introduces existing 
theories and empirical studies on private donation to NPOs and the effects of 
government's financial support on their amount of private donation. In Chapter 
3, analyzes the state of NGO's finances, its characteristics in 2002 and 2005 
and its change in this period. And I will try regression analysis on factors 
affecting the amount of NGO's private donation in Chapter 4, and on the effects 
of government's financial support on the amount of NGO's private donation in 
Chapter 5. The final chapter sums up the result of empirical analysis and draws 
policy implications for NGOs and the government. 
3) Henry Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization, The Nonprofit Sector: A Research 
Handbook, Yale University Press, 1987, pp.27-28.
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Ⅱ. LITERATURE REVIEW
     Academic studies on donation to NPOs have been conducted in 
three-fold: First, why do donors - individual, corporation, and government 
included - contribute their money to the NPOs; Secondly all factors that 
affect such donation and its level and; thirdly the effects of  government 
subsidy on private donation. However, Concerning the main topic of this 
study, "What organization do donors give their money to?", I could not find 
any results except the one titled as "preference of corporate donors" 
published by Useem(1987). Therefore, this chapter will review the existing 
theories on why each donating act to NPOs and based on which, it will 
discover grounds of deduction that what characteristics of NGO have an 
effect on the amount of donation from private sector. In addition, it will 
watch more about what the government’s financial support would bring 
about to NPOs in the previous theories and empirical outcomes. 
1. Individual Donation
     Park, Tae-gyoo and Jung, Young-seok4)  mentioned above structured 
three economic models to explain voluntary donation of individuals: public 
goods model; private consumption model and; donation reward model. 
    First of all, the public goods model5)  can be explained in that donators 
see their voluntary donations used to increase the supply of public goods to 
promote society where they live and the overall welfare of members in 
society. In principle, under the condition where the government as supplier 
of public goods, has a lack of goods or fails to provide the goods that 
4) Park, Tae-gyoo & Jung, Young-seok, Analysis on Economic Factors on Donating Act in Korea: 
focusing on Individual Donating Act, in Spring Conference of the Korean Association for NPO, 2001, 
pp.3-5
5) public goods model is asserted by Warr(1982), Bergstrom(1986), Roberts(1984), etc.
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society needs, individuals have tendency to provide the rest of the public 
goods by themselves, thereby the private sector is likely to supply a lacking 
public goods and members of the society voluntarily donate. Under this 
model, donators are not satisfied with their donating act directly but are 
satisfied when they witness other members of the society donate together, 
provide a more number of public goods and consume those goods. 
    Secondly, private consumption model6) that explains individuals’ 
voluntary donating act is equivalent to consumers’ consuming act. According 
to this model, donators are satisfied with their own donating act itself and 
the level of their satisfaction is proportionate to their contribution amount 
but are not affected by others’ donating act, which shows a difference from 
the public goods model. 
    Thirdly, under donation reward model, donators contribute to groups 
because they feel rewarded for their donation. Here the reward is referred 
to direct and indirect compensation such as rights gained from the 
organizations they donate to or social reputation, not referred to as 
"psychological satisfaction out of donation" under the private consumption 
model. This third model may be included in the private consumption model. 
2. Corporate Donation
    Corporate donation to NPOs can be initiated by two motivations:  "pure 
motivation" and "direct and indirect economic motivation." The latter has 
been increasingly emphasized these days. The core and long-time 
controversy over the latter is about "whether corporate donation as 
fulfillment of corporate social responsibility actually contributes to corporate 
profit." A variety of analysis reveals the correlation between corporate 
social performance and its economic benefits7), but the causality of the 
6) private consumption modes is asserted by Menchik &Weisbrod(1987), Andreoni(1990), Brown & 
Lankford(1992), Smith et al(1995), etc. This model is called "Warm-glow" model by Andreoni(1990).
7) Lee E. Preston & Douglas P. O'Bannon(1997), Sandra Waddock & Samuel Graves(1997), etc.
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correlation has not proved yet. Nevertheless, many entrepreneurs and 
scholars consider that corporate donation will positively contribute to the 
long-term profit of a company at the least.8)  
    Useem (1987) said corporations discriminate potential groups that they 
intend to donate to. He stated that: corporations favor NPOs that have high 
social reputation, are big and are located nearby the corporations’ 
headquarters or nearby a factory with a bigger size of workers." Especially, 
an organization with a higher social reputation receives more donations from 
corporations regardless of size. If two groups have a similar level of 
reputation, a bigger group will be donated. In addition, corporations spend 
their donations on the community nearby the headquarters or nearby a big 
scale factory.9) Also, the personal relationship between a corporation and a 
NPO is another factor for the corporation’s donation.
3. Government's Financial Support
     It has been believed that NPOs traditionally are financed from the 
private sector such as individuals and corporations, but many studies at 
home and abroad proved wrong. The U.S. government has been the biggest 
financial resource to non-profit service group and has been the single and 
biggest resource as twice as the private sector.10)  Salamon (1987) 
mentioned the government’s support for NPOs saying that the government’s 
expansive form of support to NPOs is a part of government activities called 
"the third government." He explained that under this third government 
model, while the government gives certain level of public authority and the 
8) Louis W. Fry, Gerald D. Keim & Roger E. Meiners(1982) showed that corporate donation is 
motivated by corporate profit through analysis on the relation between the level of corporate 
donation and an outlay for advertisement. According to the survey conducted by the federation of 
Korean industries in 2002, 94% of entrepreneur replied that corporate's CSR activities contribute to 
its economic profit.
9) Michal Useem, Corporate Philanthropy, The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, Yale University 
Press, 1987, pp. 342-344.
10) Lester M. Salamon, Partners in Public Service: The Scope and Theory of Government-Nonprofit 
Relations, The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, Yale University Press, 1987, pp. 101-107.
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power to use public fund to NGOs, it could avoid getting bigger in size and 
the public’s sense that the government wants to increase its power thereby 
to achieve certain goals effectively. James (1987), adding to Salamon’s 
argument, points out that NPOs can benefit from cost-effective mechanism 
such as use of volunteers. This is another benefit that NPOs can make use 
of financial and human resources in the private sector with the limited 
public fund. The third government theory is from the perspective of the 
government. James(1987) saw that NPO's production of public goods is to 
meet excessive demands for goods due to a limited supply of the 
government or differentiated taste to public goods that are consumed.11)  
When it comes to manufacturing public goods, NPOs can be more effective 
than the government; therefore a form of "private production of public 
goods and public financial support" will bring about increasing efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness. 
     At the center is "the effect of the government support on the private 
donation". Brooks12) summaries the issue into three ways: first the 
government’s financial support replaces or crowds out the private donation; 
secondly, the government support promotes or crowds in the private 
donation; lastly, the government support and the private donation are 
independent. 
     To explain the causes of crowd-out effect and its route, first, citizens’ 
support and sponsor for social cause would decrease in case that the 
government take financial responsibility of it. When NPOs are dependent on 
the government in terms of their revenue, they are more likely to be 
recognized as quasi-public agency, which in turn would lead citizens to not 
voluntarily donating to such groups. (Friedman & Friedman 1980). 
    Secondly, the government support to NPOs will make individual donators 
11) Estelle james, The Nonprofit Sector in Comparative Perspective, The Nonprofit Sector: A Research 
Handbook, Yale University Press, 1987, pp. 398-403.
12) 
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Subsector studied Crowding-in
No statistically
significant  
relationship
Crowding-out
General Schiff(1985)
Abrams & Schiff(1978)
Schiff(1985)
Lindsey & Steinberg(1990)
Social-human
 welfare)
Schiff(1985)
Schiff(1990)
Reece(1979)
Lindsey & Steinberg
(1990)
Khanna et al. (1995)
Amos(1982)
Jones(1983)
Abrams & Schmitz(1984)
Schiff(1985)
Steinberg(1985)
Schiff(1990)
Day & Devlin(1996)
Payne(1998)
Education Connolly(1997) Day & Devlin(1996)
Health Day & Devlin(1996) Khanna et al.(1995)
Arts & Culture Hughes &Luksetich(1997) Brooks(1999)
Kingma(1989)
Hughes & Luksetich(1997)
feel they are not in the mainstream. Especially most of corporate donators 
are more attracted to a strong and independent NPO. As a result, such 
recognition will discourage these big donators to donate(Laurie, 1994). 
    Thirdly, some private donators tend to maintain their financial support 
for an NPO they donate to within their control over the NPO. That is why 
the government’s intervention per se would weaken corporate control 
(Odendahl, 1990). 
    Fourth, the government support comes from taxpayers’ money so a high 
public support would decrease the individual’s disposable income, which will 
cause the decrease in individual donation (Lingle, 1992). 
[Table 1.1] Research Outcomes on the Effects of Government's Subsidy 
            to NPOs on Their Private Donation13) 
13) quoted from Brooks(2000)
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     Crowd-in effect is considered to take place when the government 
provides seed money with an NPO. First, some of the support is provided in 
a form of matching fund, which means the government matches its financial 
support with private donation thereby creates a bigger benefit to both 
donator and beneficiary. 
    Secondly, the government subsidy to an NPO that is not well-known 
have an effect to prove the quality and reputation of the NPO concerned. 
    Thirdly, the government intervention is recognized that it guarantees the 
qualification of the NPO because the public support is a reward for 
accountability of the NPO.
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Ⅲ. FINANCIAL STATE OF NGOs & ITS CHANGE 
1. Financial State of NGOs and its Changes 14)
According to [Table 1.2], the average annual revenue of NGOs in 
2002 was estimated at 358,455 thousand won. Of the revenue, business 
programs amounted to 108,819 thousand won accounting 30.2% of the total 
and becoming number one financial source and membership fee took 2nd 
place standing at 85,152 thousand won (23.7%), fundraising 56,713 thousand 
won (15.7%), research project 13.9%, other revenue (7.4%) and 
government’s support 6.4% followed. When membership fee and fundraising 
are treated as private donation, and business program, research project and 
advertisement rates are treated as service-related revenue, then the service 
-related revenue came to 162,869 thousand won, taking up a share of 
45.3% of the total revenue; private donation 141,866 thousand won, 39.4% 
and; the government's support 23,229 thousand won or 6.4%. To compare to 
statistics in 2005, 80 organizations who responded the survey above in 
2002 and 2005 showed that their revenue size and size of revenue from 
each funding source has grown over all than the average of 119 
organizations but revenue from each funding source was almost taking a 
similar share of the total revenue. 
[Table 1.2] also indicates that their state of revenue in 2005 has 
considerably changed compared to that of 2002 (data A’). The average total 
revenue was 490,462 thousand won, up 11.1% from 2002. The most 
significant change was in the membership fee revenue increased by 11.4%, 
accounting 24.9% of the total revenue and becoming the biggest financial 
contributor. Fundraising increased to 61.2% compared to that of 2002 taking 
the 2nd place. So, private donation including membership fee and fundraising 
14) statistics excluding an organization whose annual total revenue was over 10 billion won in 2005, 
So, analysis will be conducted based on the samples of 119 organizations in 2002 and 80 
organizations in 2005
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A
2002
(Total 119)
A' 
2002 
(80 replied in 2005)
B
2005
(80)
private donation
membership fee 85152.94(23.7)
109618.75
(24.8)
122218.77
(24.9)
fundraising 56486.55(15.7)
70775.00
(16.0)
114098.32
(23.2)
service-related 
revenue
business 
program
108819.33
(30.2)
131747.50
(29.8)
95771.60
(19.5)
research project 49831.09(13.8)
61837.50
(14.0)
53012.99
(10.8)
revenue from 
ad rates 
4218.49
(1.1)
5125.00
(1.1)
14763.16
(3.0)
government's support 23229.91(6.4)
23410.26
(5.3)
59880.74
(12.2)
others 26793.53(7.4)
32185.00
(7.2)
25639.21
(5.2)
Total 359285.71 441146.25 490461.81
accounts for 48.1% of the total revenue. Secondly, business program and 
research project decreased by 27.3% and 14.2% respectively from the year 
of 2002 and accounted for 19.5% and 10.8% respectively; Advertisement 
rates increased by 188.0% from 2002. So the service-related revenue 
decreased from 45.4% in 2002 to 33.3% in 2005. However, the government 
support drastically increased by 155.7% to 12.2% of the total revenue and 
became major income contributor. 
 [Table 1.2]  The Financial State of NGOs and Its Change (unit: thousand won)
 (  ), %.
The total revenue and the amount of revenue from each funding 
source in [Table 1.2] may make it difficult to understand the actual 
financial state of NGOs because a few organizations considerably affected 
the figures. [Appendix 1.3] is the outcome of quartile analysis on total 
revenue and the amount of revenue from each funding source according to 
their size. 
Looking at organization that is in the level of 50% of the total 
revenue and the amount of each revenue in 2002 compared with the 
average amount revealed that their total revenue stood at 36.2% of the 
average, membership fee 51.6%, fundraising 35.2%, and research project 
- 14 -
2002
(total 119)
2002
(80 replied in 2005)
2005
(total 80)
No. of 
Obs.
Average 
amount
No. of 
Obs.
Average 
amount
No. of 
Obs.
Average 
amount
Membership 
fee
118
(99.1) 85,874.6
80
(100) 109,618.7
77
(100) 122,218.8
Fundraising 114(95.7) 59,200.9
77
(96.2) 73,532.5
70
(89.7) 127,138.1
Business 
program
73
(61.3) 177,390.4
51
(63.7) 206,662.7
42
(54.5) 175,581.3
Project 79(66.3) 75,062.0
56
(70.0) 88,339.3
28
(36.3) 145,785.7
Advertise-
ment
23
(19.3) 21,826.1
18
(22.5) 22,777.8
19
(25.0) 59,052.6
Government 
support
41
(35.0) 66,290.2
23
(29.4) 79,391.3
47
(60.2) 99,376.6
32.1%. In particular, business program took up a mere 4.5% of the average 
and advertisement rates and government support did not incur. The quartile 
analysis on the same group who responded in 2005 showed a similar trend. 
     The quartile analysis outcome of the 2005 data shows a comparison to 
that of 2002. organization that reaches 50% level reveals that their total 
revenue increased by 8% to 42.0% of the average compared to 2002 (A’) 
and membership fee increased 4.7% to 54.8%. Meanwhile, fundraising and 
project take up 25.4% (35.3% in 2002) and 0% (32.3% in 2002) of the 
average respectively. Unlike this outcome above, the government's support 
increased from 0% in 2002 to 15.8% in 2005 showing that the government 
support played a major funding source of NGOs.
     I calculated ratio of organizations that generated more than one won 
from each funding source and the average amount of each revenue. The 
result is founded in [Table 1.3]
[Table 1.3] The Number of NGOs that Generate Revenue from Each Funding 
            Source and Their Average Amount (unit: thousand won, %)
(  ), %
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     A look at 119 organizations in 2002 revealed that most of them reaped 
membership fee and fundraising but only 61.3% of them carried out business 
program and 66.3% of them generated revenue from projects. 35% of them 
received government support and only 19.3% of the organizations made 
profits out of advertisement order. The outcome of 2005 analysis was 
different from that of 2002 (A’). Those who generated revenue out of 
fundraising decreased by 6.5% but their average amount increased 72.9%. 
Those who conduct business program decreased by 9.2% and their average 
revenue decreased 15.0%. The number of organizations that conducted 
projects decreased by 33.7% but the average amount increased 65.0%. The 
number of organizations that made advertisement profit increased slightly 
but the average profit increased by 159.2%. The number of organizations 
subject to government support drastically increased from 29.4% in 2002 to 
60.2% in 2005. Also, the average support increased by 25.1% from 2002. In 
a nutshell, less NGOs generated revenue out of fundraising, business 
programs and projects, and more NGOs received government's support in 
2005, compared the number of NGOs did in 2002. 
2. Financial State of Advocacy NGOs and its Changes 
     [Section 1] has reviewed the revenue state and changes of the overall 
NGOs. This section intends to especially focus on financial state and 
changes of a advocacy group. Before going in detail, I would like to 
compare revenue states between a service group and an advocacy group. 
Looking at the financial statements and changes listed in the Appendix 
shows difference between a service group and an advocacy group. The ratio 
of business revenue related to production and sales of service, membership 
fee and fundraising that make up of private donation shows a big difference 
in 2002. As for business revenue ratio, an advocacy group took up merely 
9.6% while a service group 52.5%. On the contrary, as for private donation 
(membership fee and donation combined), an advocacy group accounted for 
54.1% while a service group 23.4%. This trend is also seen in that of 2005 
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although there have been some changes. 
     [Table 1.4] shows that average annual revenue of a advocacy group 
posted 228,663 thousand won in 2002. Of the revenue, membership fee 
accounted for 32.4% becoming number one financial source, fundraising took 
2nd place accounting for 21.7%, project 18.1%, business program 9.6%, other 
revenue 7.5% and government's support 6.8% followed. When comparing the 
outcome of all NGOs that responded in 2002(A) with that of NGOs that 
responded in 2002 and 2005(A’), those responded in 2005 as well have 
seen their total revenue and revenue from each funding source increased 
overall, but the ratio of each revenue to total revenue showed a similar 
level. Analysis of 2002 (A’) and analysis of 2005 (B) indicates that: an 
advocacy group did not have changes in their total revenue. In a nominal 
term, the total revenue increased from 0.7% in 2002 to 2,129 thousand won. 
However, when inflation rate was 10.27% throughout the years, the total 
revenue actually decreased 8.7% to 25,483 thousand won in terms of 2002 
price.15) In addition, except government's support, total revenue from the 
private sector decreased 3.2% to 8.914 thousand won in the nominal term. 
However, when the inflation was accounted, it decreased 12.3% to 33,872 
thousand won. 
    Secondly, ratio of each revenue has considerably changed. Ratios of 
business and project revenue as well as the amount have decreased. 
Meanwhile, advertisement revenue, government support and membership fee 
have slightly increased. By size of each revenue, membership fee, 
fundraising and project revenue still took 1st, 2nd, and 3rd places. However, 
government subsidy took 4th from 6th place, advertisement upgraded to 6th 
from 7th place while business revenue nosedived to the bottom to 7th from 
4th place. 
15) National Statistical Office, According to the Main Economic Indices, consumer's price increased by 
3.5% in 2003, 3.6% in 2004 and 2.8% in 2005, compared to the price in the previous year. 
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A
2002 
(total 97)
 A'
2002 
 (66 replied in 2005)
B
2005
(66)
Private 
Donation
Membership fee
74290.72
(32.4)
93083.33
(31.9)
103092.78
(35.0)
141822.11 166855.39 153165.48
Fundraising
49632.99
(21.7)
64628.79
(22.1)
63588.58
(21.6)
95964.94 112995.85 92372.81
Service-related 
Revenue
Business 
program
22087.63
(9.6)
29406.06
(10.0)
14292.27
(4.8)
93232.97 111938.88 26993.36
Research Project 
41426.80
(18.1)
53189.39
(18.2)
39984.13
(13.6)
92304.39 108840.74 100047.81
Revenue from 
Ad rates
3175.26
(1.3)
3272.73
(1.1)
15968.25
(5.4)
11953.04 12863.24 59750.01
Government's Support
15672.63
(6.8)
17187.50
(5.8)
28229.66
(9.6)
43599.56 48584.04 50926.19
Others
17298.25
(7.5)
21716.67
(7.4)
20495.54
(6.9)
52732.90 60787.60 45922.45
Total
228662.89
(100)
291606.06
(100) 293734.70
372084.58 433488.88 344838.71
 [Table 1.4] Financial State of Advocacy NGOs  and Its Change 
(unit: thousand won, %)
     Average amount of total and each revenue in [Table 1.4] is shown to 
be affected by figures of a few organizations as they were in [Table 1.2]. 
[Appendix 1.4] is outcome of quartile analysis on total and each revenue of 
an advocacy group according to the size. The quartile analysis outcome of 
the 2002 indicates that: an organization that reached 50% level revealed 
that its total revenue remained at 47.4% of the average and membership fee 
accounted for 53.8%. Meanwhile, fundraising and project took up 40.0% and 
26.5% of the average respectively. Business program accounted for a mere 
9.0% of the average and advertisement revenue and government support did 
not occur. The quartile analysis on a group that responded in 2005 as well 
shows a similar feature. 
     Quartile analysis on data in 2005 took a different shape, however. an 
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organization that reached 50% level revealed that its total revenue increased 
8.4% to 55.8% of the average compared to that of 2002 (A’) and 
membership fee increased 9.2% to 63.0% and fundraising slightly increased 
2.3% to 42.3%. Meanwhile, business and project revenue did not incur in 
2005. But government support increased from 0% in 2002 to 15.9% 
becoming a big financial source of advocacy NGOs. 
    I calculated ratio of groups that created more than one won by type of 
income and the average of their income type by fraction. The result is 
founded in [Table 1.5]. 
     Looking at 97 organizations in 2002 revealed that most of them reaped 
membership fee and fundraising but only 63.9% and 55.6% of them 
conducted project and business program respectively. 29.4% of them 
received government's support and only 16.4% of them made profits out of 
advertisement order. The outcome of 2005 analysis (B) was different from 
that of 2002 (A’). Organizations that generated revenue out of fundraising 
decreased by 4.8% while their average amount of fundraising increased 
merely 3.5%. The 72.9% increase in [Table 1.3] were confirmed to be 
mainly because of a service group. Those who conducted business program 
decreased by 13.1% and their average revenue decreased by 36.9% as well. 
The number of organizations that conduct project decreased by 33.2% but 
the average amount increased 46.7%. The number of organizations that 
made advertisement profit increased 7.2% and their average revenue 
increased by 241.5%. The number of organizations subject to government 
support drastically increased from 26.5% in 2002 to 54.6% in 2005, 
however, the average amount of support decreased by 20.2%. 
    In a nutshell, each revenue from project, business program, and 
fundraising was observed in less organizations and that from government's 
support and advertisement rates was observed in more organization 
compared to that of 2002.
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2002
(total 119)
2002
(80 replied in 2005)
2005
(total 80)
No. of 
Obs.
Average 
amount
No. of 
Obs.
Average 
amount
No. of 
Obs.
Average 
amount
Membership 
fee
97
(100) 74,290.7
66
(100) 93,083.3
63
(100) 103,092.8
Fundraising 94(96.9) 51,504.3
64
(96.9) 66,648.4
59
(92.1) 68,977.4
Business 
program
54
(55.6) 39,675.9
38
(57.5) 51,073.7
28
(44.4) 32,157.6
Project 62(63.9) 64,812.9
45
(68.1) 78,011.1
22
(34.9) 114,500.0
Advertise-
ment
16
(16.4) 19,250.0
11
(16.6) 19,636.4
15
(23.8) 67,066.7
Government 
support
28
(29.4) 53,175.0
17
(26.5) 64,705.9
35
(54.6) 51,619.9
[Table 1.5] The Number of Advocacy NGOs that Generate Revenue from 
            Each Funding Source and Their Average Amount 
(unit: thousand won, %)
( ), %
2.1. According to the size of city where a NGO Located
     By the size of city where a NGO located, financial state and changes 
of an advocacy group were analyzed and listed on [Appendix 1.5]. Looking 
at the 2002 data showed that total revenue of an advocacy group located in 
Seoul and other six metropolitan cities reaped as much as 4.56 times as 
that of a group located in small-medium sized cities. This group in big 
cities shows higher ratio of fundraising and project revenue while lower 
ratio of membership fee and government support compared to those in small 
cities. Private donation including membership fee and fundraising accounted 
for 54.5% for big cities and 52.1% for small cities respectively which 
indicates a similar share of the total revenue. 
     Looking at the 2005 data revealed that revenue from business and 
project took up a less share of the total revenue compared to in 2002 
regardless of city size. However, the data clearly shows that project 
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revenue of those in small cities has significantly decreased, on the other 
hand business revenue decreased more sharply in big cities. Both groups 
have seen their share of government's support and advertisement revenue 
increased: however, a group in small cities has a higher increase. While it 
has a slightly lower share of membership fee, a group in big cities has a 
4% higher than in 2002. Private donation including membership fee and 
fundraising increased to 57.7% for a group in big cities and decreased to 
51.8% for one in small cities respectively which is a stark contrast. 
2.2. According to the size of annual total revenue
     In order to analyze what differences do NGO's financial state and trend 
of its change show as the total revenue size grows, I classified into four 
groups according to the size of total revenue and analyzed average amount 
of each revenue and their ratio to total revenue. [Appendix 1.6] indicates 
that as the size of total revenue increases the amount of membership fee 
increase, but its ratio decreases. This trend is found in both 2002 and 
2005. In 2002, ratios of business, project and government's support showed 
a increasing trend as total revenue increased, but it was not the case in 
2005. Especially a group with the biggest revenue size show this trend 
significantly. Ratio of business revenue decreased by 8.5% which took up 
the least share of financial resources. On the other hand, ratio of 
advertisement revenue and government support increased by 6.2% and 3.6% 
respectively. Meanwhile, organizations with smaller-sized total revenue have 
a lesser ratio of project revenue and a relatively higher ratio of 
government's support. 
2.3. According to the number of media reports
     In order to analyze what differences do NGO's financial state and trend 
of its change show as the level of media exposure goes up, I classified into 
four groups according to the number of media reports and analyzed their 
average amount of each revenue and their ratio to total revenue. The 
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outcome is found in [Appendix 1.7]. The result shows a different pattern 
from one that was analyzed according to total revenue size. In 2002, as 
organizations were more exposed to the press, they were more likely to 
collect bigger fundraising while their government support tends to decrease. 
And the ratio of membership fee was stable overall. However, the 2005 
date shows that: as the number of media reports increase, the ratio of 
project revenue goes drastically up, the ratio of fundraising increases 
steadily. But the ratio of business revenue has decreased. The ratio of 
membership fee was not affected by the level of press exposure as in 2002 
and the ratio of government's support was on a steady decrease overall. 
3. Financial State of Advocacy NGOs and Its Change  
   according to Their Attitude to Government's Support16)
     [Table 1.6] categorized advocacy NGOs into four: group 1 that did not 
receive government support both in 2002 and 2005; group 2 that did not 
receive it in 2002 but received in 2005; group 3 that received it in 2002 
but did not receive in 2005; and group 4 that did receive it both in 2002 
and 2005. And I analyzed the amount of each revenue and their ratio to 
total revenue in 2002. [Table 1.7] is the analysis outcome of the 
2005-data. 
    Looking at financial state and changes by group indicates that group 1 
has seen ratio of private donation that includes membership fee and 
fundraising increase to 2.70%; fundraising, business and project revenue 
decrease and; advertisement revenue drastically increase. Group 2 witnessed 
private donation decrease by 3.4%; business revenue decrease significantly 
and; fundraising and project decrease as well. Group 4 has seen its ratio of 
private donation increase by nearly 10%; business and project revenue 
decrease and; advertisement revenue increase. This group’s total revenue 
16) Statistics excluding 4 organizations that didn't answer on the amount government's support, from 66 
advocacy organizations that replied in both 2002 and 2005.
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 Total 
revenue
Member 
-ship fee
Fundrais 
-ing
Business 
program
Project Advertise
-ment
Gov't 
support
Group 1 Mean 319913.04 134739.13 71704.35 22500.00 58130.43 2478.26 .00
(No in both) % 42.1 22.4 7.0 18.1 0.7
Group 2 Mean 254047.62 82880.95 58061.90 47633.33 43809.52 428.57 .00
(Yes only in 2005) % 32.6 22.8 18.7 17.2 0.1
Group 3 Mean 228200.00 61200.00 60000.00 6800.00 56200.00 2000.00 28800.00
(Yes only in 2002) %
Group 4 Mean 383615.38 61769.23 80538.46 25615.38 69346.15 10384.62 75000.00
(Yes in both) % 16.1 20.9 6.6 18.0 2.7 19.5
 Total 
revenue
Member 
-ship fee
Fundrais 
-ing
Business 
program
Project Advertise
-ment
Gov't 
support
Group 1 Mean 317347.83 151817.39 61826.09 13695.65 35608.70 31130.43 .00
(No in both) % 47.8 19.4 4.3 11.2 9.8
Group 2 Mean 261436.48 81442.38 54892.10 19107.76 36333.33 952.38 42033.24
(Yes only in 2005) % 31.1 20.9 7.3 13.8 0.3 16.0
Group 3 Mean 275463.75 71438.75 44483.75 13587.50 50000.00 1250.00 .00
(Yes only in 2002) %
Group 4 Mean 348384.62 70416.67 92076.92 10233.33 61416.67 21750.00 66846.15
(Yes in both) % 20.2 26.4 2.9 17.6 6.2 19.1
decreased by 35,231 thousand won on average. Looking at the change in 
the amount of each revenue reveals that: total amount of decrease in 
business, project and government's support was almost similar to total 
amount of increase in membership fee, fundraising and advertisement 
revenue. This is because decrease in other revenue was 31,414 thousand 
won and accounted for 89.1% of the decrease in the total revenue. 
Unfortunately, the details regarding other income have not been surveyed 
and therefore were not analyzed. 
[Table 1.6] Financial State of Advocacy NGOs according to Their Attitude to  
            Government's Support, 2002             (unit: thousand won, %)
The Data includes only organizations replied in both 2002 and 2005
No. of Obs. of group 1, 2, 3, 4, are 23, 21, 5, 13 respectively.
[Table 1.7] Financial State of Advocacy NGOs according to Their Attitude to 
            Government's Support, 2005            (unit: thousand won, %) 
No. of Obs. of group 1, 2, 3, 4, are 23, 21, 4, 13 respectively.
     [Tables 1.6] and [Table 1.7] show, first, that advocacy NGOs suffered 
more financial difficulties in 2005 compared to 2002. Except group 3 that 
was excluded from the analysis due to little number of samples, group 1 
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and group 4 have seen their total revenue decrease. Group 2’s total 
revenue appeared to have increased by 7,389 thousand but actually this 
group decreased by 34,644 thousand won (down 13.6% from 2002), except 
government's support because the group did not receive it in 2002. 
Therefore, group 2 suffered most from financial difficulties. When inflation 
(10.27%) is counted, the actual decrease is higher. 
     Secondly, decreasing amount and its ratio of total revenue of group 1 
was much lower than other groups. Group 1 witnessed total revenue 
decrease by 2,565 thousand won (down 0.8% from 2002) on average; but 
group 4 saw the total revenue decrease by 35,231 thousand won (down 
9.1% from 2002). Group 2 indicates that its total revenue decreased by 
34,644 thousand won (down 13.6% from 2002) when government support 
that the group did not receive in 2002 is excluded. 
Thirdly, as for membership fee out of total revenue, group 1 came in 
first (42.1%: 2002 47.8%: 2005), followed by group 2 (2002: 32.6%, 2005: 
31.1%),and group 4 (2002: 16.1%, 2005: 20.2%). Such order is replicated in 
private donation consisting of membership fee and fundraising.
      Fourthly, aggravated financial trouble mainly resulted from declining 
business, projects and fundraising revenue in that order except group 4 
whose private donation increased. Declining revenue from business program 
took the most part followed by decline in revenue from project and 
fundraising. 
      Explaining in detail, group 1 with no government financial support 
experienced fall in revenue from fundraising, business and projects while 
rise from membership fee and advertisement. Group 2 saw revenue decline 
in most fields except advertisement taking negligible portion while offsetting 
the increase in government support in 2005. Group 4 witnessed revenue 
decline in business, projects, and government’s support while increase in 
membership fee, fundraising and advertisement revenue. Although revenue 
- 24 -
coming from membership fee increased, its ratio out of the total revenue 
accounted for 20.2%, much lower than 47.5% of group 1 that didn't receive 
in both 2002 and 2005 and 31.3% of group 2 that received only in 2005. 
Analysis on group 3 which received government’s support only in 2002 
hasn’t been conducted due to little number of samples available. 
      To sum up these analysis results, first of all, revenue from business 
program and projects declined in all groups, and the amount of fundraising 
declined in all except group 4. Secondly, the group 1 without government 
support showed increase in membership fee and advertisement. Thirdly, 
Change in amount of government support and membership fee/advertisement 
took the opposite directions in group 4 with the support in two years and 
group 2 with the support in just 2005. Of course, group 2 saw 
advertisement revenue grow despite increase in government support, but the 
amount or its ratio of the total revenue is very negligible. It can be 
interpreted as the same phenomenon that group 1 that didn't receive 
government's support in both 2002 and 2005 shows increase in the amount 
of membership fee and advertisement revenue. This phenomenon is 
observed in a service group as well. [Table 1.8] indicates comparison of 
financial state on service organizations.  Service NGOs and advocacy NGOs 
have homogeneity as non-profit organization while having differences in 
many aspects. [Table 1.9] shows that government's support significantly 
expanded while revenue from membership and advertisement order 
decreased. 
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 Total 
revenue
Member 
-ship fee
Fundrais 
-ing
Business 
program
Project Advertis
e-ment
Gov't 
support
Others
2002 Mean 1029818.18 164272.73 78590.91 542636.36 92954.55 17545.45 59636.36 85500.00
(11) % 15.9 7.6 52.6 9.0 1.7 5.7 8.3
2005 Mean 1062363.64 92363.64 82000.00 501181.82 131181.82 1600.00 232909.09 20272.73
(11) % 9.0 7.7 47.1 12.3 0.1 21.9 1.9
[Table 1.8]  Financial State of Service NGOs in 2002 and 200517)
                (unit: thousand won, %)
     On the assumption that the amount of revenue from business and 
project are dependent of the amount of government support, there can be 
three assumptions on the phenomenon that change in amount of government 
support and membership fee/advertisement take opposite directions.
      The first is the possibility that the number of samples was not enough 
to reflect reality. As such, these phenomena could happen independently 
each other or the third factor that has not been discovered yet caused the 
effect. Or these phenomena themselves have possibly not taken place in 
practice.
      Secondly, it can be the results due to the 'Crowd-out' effect of 
government's support on the amount of membership fee and advertisement 
revenue. In general, analysis on the effect of government's financial support 
takes the amount of private donation including membership fee and 
fundraising as a dependent variable, not advertisement revenue. But, here is 
the catch: the uniqueness of Korean society. The publicity effect of NGOs' 
periodicals is less than that of other entities’ periodicals  whose purpose is 
to make profit. Therefore, advertising order to NGOs can be regarded as a 
type of corporate donation. It is a well-known fact that corporations’ 
advertising order is easier than donating in cash to NGOs, from the 
17) statistics excluding 3 organizations whose fundraising volume in 2002 extremely increased by 
738.8% compared to that in 2002. Their average revenue from fundraising is 1,309,333 thousand 
won in 2005 and 177,333 thousand won in 2002. In case of including these three organizations, 
average fundraising revenue of overall NGOs is shown to increase by 61.2%, while that is shown to 
decrease by 0.5% in case of excluding them. 
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corporate perspective. As for NGOs, especially an advocacy group has less 
burdens when they receive advertising order rather than cash. This is 
because the society is not receptive to corporate donation and because 
many NGOs, recognizing this social perception, set the cap (maximum 
amount) they can get from a corporation a year. Considering these aspects, 
related three tables shows that government's support clearly goes opposite 
from (membership fee + advertisement revenue). Whether there is 
crowd-out effect of government support on private donation or not, will be 
investigated through cross-section regression analysis and panel analysis in 
Chapter 5. 
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Ⅳ. ANALYSIS ON FACTORS INFLUENCING PRIVATE   
    DONATION 
      In this Chapter, I will try regression analysis on factors influencing 
the amount of private donation to NGO based on the surveyed data, by 
using cross-section OLS and panel fixed-effect model. 
1. Modeling
     According to economic theories on voluntary donating act explained in 
Chapter 2, donors contribute to NPOs to satisfy themselves. Private 
consumption model shows that donation itself can bring about utility while 
public goods model indicates that one’s donation and others’ combine to 
produce and supply the goods that will be consumed. According to these 
theories that voluntary donation, like other consuming acts, is another act to 
gain utility, donation can be assumed that their act will maximize utility. 
Therefore, it can be presumed that donors select NGOs that they can gain 
maximum utility. 
      I have failed to find any researches that explain which groups 
individual donors favor. However, Useem (1987)’s founding that corporations 
favor NPOs that "have high social reputation, bigger size and are located 
nearby the corporations’ headquarters or nearby a factory with a bigger size 
of workers" may apply to donation pattern of individual donors. In addition, 
he said that the personal relationship between a corporation and a NPO is 
another factor for the corporation’s donation toward a certain organization. 
     First of all, donors are expected to have much more utility by donating 
to NGOs in a community that they are belonging to than to organizations in 
other areas. Even under the public goods model, as NGOs’ activities are 
done mainly or partly to meet demands of the community concerned, 
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individual donors believe that they will have higher utility when they donate 
to organizations in their community than they do to other communities. Even 
under private consumption model and donation reward model, they will enjoy 
a higher psychological satisfaction and social reputation through donating to 
organizations in their community. 
     Secondly, social reputation and size of a organization are assumed to 
have an positive effect on donor's donating act through two routines: One, 
generally as the organization has a higher social reputation and bigger size, 
it would be recognized as one to create much public goods, social benefits 
with higher quality. Donors are expected to contribute more to an 
organization which produces more social benefits with higher quality. The 
other is: the size and reputation may have an positive effect on the trust 
from donors and thereby will attract more donation. 
     Thirdly, a bigger NGO is expected to have more human and financial 
resources and to have a wider network with potential donors in the 
community. This means a bigger organization is in a better position for 
attracting private donation than a smaller organization is. Thus, we can 
make a hypothesis on donor's donating act in private sector  as follows. 
Hypothesis. All other things equal, donors contribute to a NGO with a        
             higher social reputation, a bigger size and located in their       
             community. From the perspective of NGO, their social           
             reputation, size, and the number of community members have   
             an positive effect on the amount of private donation. 
     In addition, whether a NGO is a service or an advocacy NGO may 
impact private donation. According to the result of descriptive analysis on 
NGO's financial state, a service group shows more amount of private 
donation than an advocacy group does. 
      As variables to indicate social reputation and recognition level, I 
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choose the number of media reports and active years. A longer activity 
period and the more number of media reports are expected to enhance 
social reputation under the same condition. As size variables, I select the 
number of members and the number of workers. As for the number of 
community members, I will use dummy variables for Seoul and six other 
metropolitan cities and the service NGO dummy variable will be used to tell 
service groups from advocacy groups. Through this review, the amount of 
private donation can be expressed as a function: 
     Private Donation = f (Member, Worker, News, Actyr, Seoul/Metro, SVC)
     where, Member = number of members
             Worker = number of workers
             News = number of media reports
             Actyr = number of years of activities
             Seoul/Metro = a NGO in Seoul or 6 metropolitan cities
             SVC = a service NGO
     The number of media reports is calculated from January 1 to December 
31 for a certain year based on news reports of KINDS by group featured 
on national daily newspapers including Donga Daily, Gyeunghang Daily, 
Munhwa ilbo, Hangyeorae Daily, Hankook Ilbo, and Kookmin Daily. The 
active period is the months which was subtracted from their foundation date 
based on June 2002 and June 2005 respectively. 
2. Result of Cross-Section Regression Analysis
    [Table 1.9] shows that the coefficient estimates of the number of 
member, workers and media reports have positive values, at least, at .05 
significance level in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and fourth equations. According to 
[Table 1.9], as the number of members, workers and media reports 
increase by 10%, the amount of private donation is shown to increase by 
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A
2002
(total)
A'
2002
(replied in 2005)
B
2005
1 2 3 4 5 6
SVC .116(.501)
.057
(.278)
.277
(.934)
.144
(.541)
-.603*
(-1.823)
-.753***
(-2.731)
Seoul/Metro .179(1.248)
.187
(1.321)
.114
(.660)
.130
(.756)
.038
(.203)
.055
(.296)
ln(Member) .295***(4.199)
.288***
(4.180)
.298***
(3.683)
.277***
(3.543)
.473***
(4.413)
.447***
(4.373)
ln(Worker) .292***(3.176)
.286***
(3.142)
.293***
(2.707)
.291***
(2.690)
.436***
(3.440)
.436***
(3.446)
ln(News) .152***(3.027)
.148***
(2.989)
.157**
(2.493)
.150**
(2.402)
-.049
(-.782)
-.055
(-.869)
ln(Actyr) -.049(-.568)
-.100
(-1.007)
-.134
(-.827)
Constant 8.428***(20.266)
8.285***
(25.062)
8.652***
(18.535)
8.385***
(21.824)
8.452***
(11.142)
7.996***
(15.414)
Adj R² 679 .682 .712 .712 .680 .682
Obs. 116 116 77 77 77 77
2.95%, 2.92% and 1.5% respectively.
[Table 1.9] Results of OLS Regression Analysis on Private Donation18)
Dependent Variable: ln(amount of membership fee and fundraising)
(  ), t-value, ***: p<.01, **: p<.05, *: p<.1
    The fifth and sixth equation based on the data of 2005 have different 
features from those of the 1st to fourth equation based on the data of 
2002. It means that there had been some change in factors influencing on 
NGO's private donation. First, the values of coefficient estimates of the 
number of members and workers are shown to increase considerably. 
Increase in the number of members by 10% is shown to cause the amount 
of private donation to increase by 4.47 to 4.73% in 2005, while it cause 
increase in private donation by 2.77-2.98% in 2002. And Increase in the 
number of workers by 10% is shown to cause the amount of private 
donation to increase by 4.36% in 2005, while it cause increase in private 
donation by 2.86-2.93% in 2002. This means that the influence of these 
variables on the amount of private donation had increased in this period. 
18) I excluded 3 organizations mentioned in footnote 13. It is because including these 3 organization 
into regression analysis may cause distorted result. 
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    Second, the coefficient estimate of the number of media reports variable 
don't show significant value. It means that the frequency of news reports 
hasn't an effect on the amount of private donation any more. 
    Thirdly, the coefficient estimate of service NGO variable shows negative 
value, at least, at .1 significance level.  The result of the fifth and sixth 
equation show that the amount of private donation decrease by 60.3 to 
75.3% in case that a NGO is a service organization compared to the case of 
advocacy one. 
3. Result of Panel Fixed-Effect Regression Analysis 
 
    In this section, I  tried panel analysis on factors influencing the amount of 
NGO's private donation by using fixed-effect model. Compared to cross-section 
data, panel data have advantages; the problem of degree of freedom get smaller 
relatively  because of more number of observations compared to cross-section 
analysis or time-series analysis and the efficiency of estimates; We can 
consider the trend of change in cross-section  estimates due to the passage of 
time. 
     According to [Table 1.10], the coefficient estimates of variables of the 
number of members and workers have significant values at .05 significance 
level in both the 1st and 2nd equation. The table shows that increase by 10% in 
the number of members and workers caused the amount of private donation to 
increase by 2.54 to 2.63%  and  4.3 to 4.5% respectively. On the other hand, the 
coefficient estimate of the number of news reports variable has negative value 
at .01 significance level in the 2nd equation and .1 in the 1st equation. It means 
that increase by 10% in the number of press exposure caused decrease by 1.2% 
in the amount of private donation. 
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1 2
SVC (dropped)
Seoul/Metro (dropped)
ln(Member) .254**(2.32)
.263**
(2.47)
ln(Worker) .430**(2.16)
.454**
(2.39)
ln(News) -.122*(-1.88)
-.139***
(-2.72)
ln(Actyr) .079(.43)
Constant 8.994***(8.40)
9.308***
(12.06)
  R²  within
      between
      overall
.232
.556
.545
.229
.553
.544
Number of Obs.
Number of groups
130
74
130
74
sigma_u
sigma_e
rho
.647
.446
.678
.651
.443
.684
 [Table  1.10]  Results of  Panel Fixed-effect Regression Analysis on NGO's 
                     Private Donation 
                    Dependent Variable: ln(amount of membership fee and fundraising)
4. Conclusion on Factors Influencing Private Donation
     By analyzing outcome of statistics in Section 2 and 3, we can reach 
the conclusion that variables of member and workers have significant 
positive effects on the amount of private donation. However, variables of 
workers and variables of private donation may raise a causality issue. As 
employees increase, it can be interpreted that more members and donors 
can subscribe to a civic group. But at the same time, increase in total 
revenue due to increase of private donation may have brought about 
employment of more employees. 
    Variable of media reports affected greatly in 2002 but did not in 2005.  
According to [Table 1.10], This change resulted from the fact NGOs with 
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higher growth rate of the number of media reports, showed lower increasing 
rate of the amount of private donation between 2002 and 2005. This change 
gives very important implications to NGOs. Except grass-root organization 
that took hold in small communities, the media is the only means to let 
citizens know NGOs' activities. As the number of media reports of a NGO is 
thought to reflect the amount of its activities, such a change can be 
interpreted that increasing social activities of NGOs do not have significant 
positive effects on the volume of private donation. My other researches, 
also, show that the number of media reports did not have significant effects 
on growth rate of membership in this period.  
      There would be some reasons for this change. First, a growing 
number of negative news reports on NGOs by the so-called "conservative" 
media. I did not check statistics, but it is a well-known fact that the 
conservative media have criticized NGOs’ activities negatively from the early 
stage of current government; campaign for introduction of some reformative 
laws, grand-scale street demonstration with candles to protest against 
impeachment of President Roh in 2004, etc. During the process, it is true 
that the so-called ‘progressive" media sympathized with positions of NGOs. 
However in the media-market where conservative media have overwhelmed, 
there is no doubt that the public got negative image of NGOs through those 
negative reports of conservative media. 
     Secondly, since 2002 when the current government took power, 
Korea’s civil society further have engaged itself in political and ideological 
conflicts. The existing conservative organizations started act proactively, 
and the so-called "new right" group appeared in 2005 and drew more 
attention from the conservative media. Criticism against from the 
conservative media and conservative political party to NGOs' activities have 
been continued. As this situation was going on, some of the existing 
members and the base of NGO's support shifted to conservative groups or 
withdrew their support. Under this condition, it is possible to conclude that; 
while the rest of members and the base of support consolidated within 
- 34 -
them, they did not grow any further. It is difficult to expect that increased 
number of press exposures would resulted in increasing private donation 
under this condition. 
     Thirdly, while the first and second is about short-term reason, the 
following reasons can be the long-term one: diluted critical mind of the 
public to society or social issues due to political democratization; continued 
economic difficulties, routine restructuring processes and high rate of 
unemployment, spread mammonism due to real-estate speculation, etc. We 
can infer that these changes could cause citizens' apathy to NGOs' 
activities, or allowed citizens not to participate in or financially support 
NGOs even though they sympathize themselves with NGOs. 
     These three explanations I presumed are not exclusive one another. In 
other words, all of them may have interacted one another. There may be 
other explanations, too. But one thing is clear: as mentioned above, the 
more activities haven't an positive effect on private donation unless this 
social situation surrounding NGOs will change. In this environment, 
therefore, the private donation volume would be more greatly affected by 
internal capacity that means the number of membership and workers. [Table 
1.9] supports my conclusion: the value of coefficient estimates of 
membership and workers variables grew more than 50%. 
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2002
(total)
2002
(replied in 2005) 2005
1 2 3 4 5 6
SVC .152(.438)
.071
(.346)
.222
(.426)
.097
(.354)
-.783**
(-2.264)
-.749**
(-2.681)
Seoul/Metro .230(.814)
.240
(1.627)
-.034
(-.095)
.141
(.774)
-.100
(-.355)
.057
(.305)
ln(Member) .517***(3.576)
.284***
(4.003)
.475**
(2.760)
.291***
(3.547)
.591***
(4.140)
.450***
(4.320)
ln(Worker) .309(1.154)
.313***
(3.368)
.201
(.550)
.312**
(2.668)
.223
(1.195)
.434***
(3.396)
ln(News) .044(.349)
.110**
(2.006)
.181
(1.238)
.122
(1.610)
-.127
(-1.342)
-.057
(-.883)
ln(Gov't support) -.143(-.785)
.097
(.439)
.048
(.463)
Ratio of Gov't 
support
-.007
(-1.591)
-.004
(-.633)
-.001
(-.193)
Constant 8.413***(4.666)
8.402***
(23.784)
6.143**
(2.728)
8.370***
(20.340)
7.117***
(7.127)
7.997***
(15.275)
Adj R² .623 .690 .689 .712 .585 .676
Obs. 38 114 22 75 45 75
Ⅴ. REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON THE EFFECTS OF 
   GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT TO PRIVATE DONATION 
1. Modeling 
     To know how the government’s financial support affects the private 
donation of NGOs, I conducted cross-section regression analysis, including  
the amount of government support and its ratio to total revenue as 
explanatory variables into the model in Chapter 4. 
2. Results 
    According to [Table 1.11], the coefficient estimates of variables of the 
amount of government's support and its ratio don't show significant value in 
any equation. 
[Table 1.11] Results of OLS Regression Analysis on Private Donation
Dependent Variable: ln(amount of membership fee and fundraising)
(  ), t-value, ***: p<.01, **: p<.05, *: p<.1
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1 2
SVC (dropped)
Seoul/Metro (dropped)
ln(Member) .532(1.39)
.340***
(2.92)
ln(Worker) .533(1.73)
.445**
(2.34)
ln(News) .044(.40)
-.124**
(-2.10)
ln(Gov't support) .237(1.86)
Ratio of Gov't 
support
.009
(1.20)
Constant 4.203(1.33)
8.672***
(10.23)
  R²  within
      between
      overall
.645
.543
.579
.275
.544
.547
Number of Obs.
Number of groups
55
45
128
73
sigma_u
sigma_e
rho
.866
.231
.933
.653
.437
.690
      I tried panel fixed-effect regression analysis based on panel data 
integrating data surveyed in 2002 and 2005, in order to analyze change 
between observed values in cross-section due to passage of time. [Table 
1.12] reports that the coefficient estimates of variables of the amount of 
government's support and its ratio don't have significant values. 
[Table 1.12] Results of  Panel Fixed-effect Regression Analysis on Private 
                   Donation
       Dependent Variable: ln(amount of membership fee and fundraising)
    Next time, I tried cross-section regression analysis again, replacing 
dependent variable of private donation(membership fee + fundraising) with 
membership fee or (membership fee + advertisement revenue) that show 
significant relation with government's support in Chapter 3, and replacing 
explanatory variable of the amount of government's support with dummy 
variable of government's support, 'NGO receiving government's support = 1, 
NGO not to receive = 0'. The [Table 1.13], the result of this regression 
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D.Variable=ln(membership fee)  D.Variable = ln(membership fee        + advertisement revenue)
1 2 3 1 2 3
2002
(total)
2002
(replied in 
2005)
2005 2002(total)
2002
(replied in 
2005)
2005
SVC .090(.366)
.247
(.908)
-.289
(-1.082)
.086
(.348)
.272
(1.015)
-.574*
(-1.955)
Seoul/Metro .151(.885)
.098
(.540)
.111
(.634)
.109
(.642)
.072
(.403)
-.082
(-.453)
ln(Member) .293***(3.552)
.242***
(2.909)
.259**
(2.667)
.285***
(3.446)
.243***
(2.967)
.237**
(2.312)
ln(Worker) .254**(2.359)
.209*
(1.875)
.376***
(3.113)
.253**
(2.350)
.211*
(1.919)
.511***
(4.102)
ln(News) .138**(2.285)
.168**
(2.436)
.033
(.544)
.160**
(2.645)
.184***
(2.709)
.047
(.759)
Gov't support -.270*(-1.711)
-.138
(-.853)
-.374**
(-2.617)
-.195
(-1.234)
-.071
(-.444)
-.338**
(-2.276)
Constant 7.958***(19.612)
8.330***
(20.399)
8.825***
(18.080)
7.989***
(19.682)
8.288***
(20.609)
8.906***
(17.180)
Adj R² .593 .653 .644 .593 .671 .650
Obs. 99 68 58 99 68 57
analysis, shows considerably different feature from that of [Table 1.11] and 
[Table 1.12]. 
[Table 1.13] Resultss of OLS Regression Analysis on Membership fee and 
             Revenue from (Membership fee and Advertisement Order) 1.
(  ), t-value, ***: p<.01, **: p<.05, *: p<.1
    In case of replacing dependent variable of private donation, (membership 
fee + fundraising), with variable of the amount of membership fee, the 
coefficient estimate of government's support dummy variable show negative 
value at .1 significance level in the 1st equation and at .05 in the 3rd 
equation. It can be interpreted that the government's support have 
'crowd-out' effect on the amount of NGO's membership fee. 
    In case of replacing dependent variable of private donation with 
(membership fee + advertisement revenue), the coefficient estimate of 
government's support dummy variable show negative value at .05 
significance level in the 3rd equation while didn't show significance value in 
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the 1st and 2nd equation. It means that government's support had no 
significant effect on the amount of membership fee and advertisement 
revenue in 2002, but came to have significant 'crowd-out' effect on it in 
2005. 
    According to [Table 1.13], a NGO receiving government's support, its 
amount of membership fee and (membership fee + advertisement revenue) 
decrease by 37.4% and 33.8% respectively compared to those of a NGO not 
to receive. This result is interpreted to back up the result of descriptive 
analysis in Section 3. 
3. Conclusion on The Effect of Government's Support on Private 
   Donation
    we witnessed that change in the volume of government support 
occurred in the opposite direction with change in the volume of private 
donation in Section 3, and that government's support has negative effect on 
the amount of membership fee and (membership fee + advertisement 
revenue) in this Section. 
    But, this result is not enough to conclude that government's support 
have a 'crowd-out' effect on the amount of membership fee and of 
(membership fee and advertisement revenue). It is because there can be 
causality issue between government's support and membership fee. We can't 
know from this result whether government's support crowded out 
membership fee or the opposite is the case. I failed to find a proper 
instrumental variable to be able to verify the causality issue. So, I will try 
to verify, based on the data, that the assumptions are not true that change 
in the amount of membership fee and advertisement revenue could affect on 
the amount of government's support.
    The first assumption can be that the government could give some more 
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money to NGOs with smaller amount of membership fee for the cause of 
helping NGOs with financial difficulty. But according to 'the screening 
criteria for selecting government's support project' of the plan of non-profit 
organizations support program published by the Ministry of Government 
Administration and Home Affairs, the financial state of subscribed 
organizations isn't included into the criteria.19) 
    The second assumption is that organizations, which faced decrease in 
membership fee and/or advertisement revenue, started to get government's 
support that they didn't before, or made efforts to increase it. It seems 
plausible, but NGOs' financial difficulty was not caused from decrease in 
membership fee and advertisement revenue, at least, in the data shown in 
[Table 1.6] and [Table 1.7].
    In case of group 1 that didn't receive government's support in both 
2002 and 2005, increase in membership fee and advertisement revenue 
didn't affect the amount of government's support because they didn't receive 
it in 2005. Group 2 that didn't receive government's support in 2002 but 
received in 2005, showed decrease by 1,438 thousand won in membership 
fee but increase by 524 thousand won in advertisement revenue.  1,438 
thousand won accounted for 1.7% of total membership fee and 4.2% of total 
amount of decrease in total revenue except government's support that they 
didn't receive in 2002. Meanwhile government's support went up from zero 
to 42,033 thousand won. So, it seems to be difficult to say that the amount 
of decrease in membership fee caused such a high increase in government's 
support. 
    Group 4 that received government's support in both 2002 and 2005, 
showed decrease in government's support by 8,154 thousand won while 
increase in membership fee and advertisement revenue by 8,647 thousand 
19) The screening criteria contains screening points as follows; responsibility and specialty, recent 
record of performance of applicants, creativity, efficiency, appropriateness, feasibility and a ripple 
effect of the project, appropriateness of budget plan and matching-fund, performance evaluation of 
project in previous year.
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won and 11,366 thousand won respectively. In this case, it seems to be 
difficult to assert that increase in membership fee and advertisement 
revenue caused decrease in government's support. This group can be 
regarded as a group that had received government's support continuously. 
So, it seems to be irrational to assume that they reduced voluntarily the 
amount of request for government's support as their membership fee 
increased, and that the government reduced the amount of support to the 
NGOs for the reason of increase in their membership fee as we can know 
in the screening criteria for selecting government's support project 
mentioned above.
    [Table 1.8] that analyze a service group shows considerably different 
feature from other groups of advocacy NGOs. This group shows decrease in 
membership fee and advertisement revenue by 71,909 thousand won and 
15,945 thousand won respectively while increase in government's support by 
173,273 thousand won. In this case, the assumption is possible that 
considerable decrease in membership fee and advertisement revenue could 
cause increase in government's support. But the opposite assumption can be 
possible, too. 
    So, because feature in [Table 1.13] can be the results distorted by 
service organizations belonging to this group, I will try another regression 
analysis based only on advocacy NGOs. [Table 1.14] is the result. The 
coefficient estimate of government's support dummy variable shows negative 
value as before, at .05 significance level in the 1st equation and at .1 in the 
2nd. I, also, tried panel fixed-effect regression analysis by the same 
method, but I failed to find significant result. 
    These analysis results can be thought as the proof that it is difficult to 
assert that change in membership fee and advertisement revenue caused 
change in government's support, at least, in advocacy NGOs. Accordingly, it 
seems to be rational to conclude that change in government's support 
resulted in change in membership fee and advertisement revenue, in other 
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1 2
Seoul/Metro .161(.988)
-.031
(-.182)
ln(Member) .356***(3.069)
.262**
(2.137)
ln(Worker) .220(1.355)
.483***
(2.806)
ln(News) .001**(2.120)
.001*
(1.853)
Gov't support -.303**(-2.275)
-.246*
(-1.751)
Constant 8.353***(14.549)
8.709***
(14.332)
Adj R² .692 .690
Obs. 59 59
word, government's support showed an 'crowd-out' effect on NGOs' 
membership fee and advertisement revenue, which can be regarded as a 
form of corporate donation. 
[Table 1.14] Results of OLS Regression Analysis on Membership fee and 
             Revenue from (Membership fee and Advertisement Order) 2. 
      Based on the data of advocacy NGOs, 2005
      Dependent Variable: ln(amount of membership fee) in the 1st equation &
      ln(amount of membership fee and advertisement revenue) in the 2nd equation
      (  ), t-value, ***: p<.01, **: p<.05, *: p<.1 
    At this point, what I want to point out is about what the route did 
government's support have an effect on NGOs' membership fee through. 
Related to this, almost all existing theories and empirical studies have 
focused on change in donor's donating act as we know from Chapter 2. But 
this study didn't take approach like that because of characteristics of the 
data. This study focuses on change in NGO members' act. From this point 
of view, this study is experimental trial with limitation to some degree. 
    I think that 'crowd-out' effect of government's support shown in this 
study can be explained by using 'cost-benefit analysis' model. To focus on 
advocacy NGOs, their financial difficulty came mainly from decrease in 
revenue from business program and project. There were only two 
alternatives to overcome these financial difficulty for them; first, to increase 
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membership fee and advertisement revenue; second, to receive more 
government' support. 
    In general, NGOs are thought to prefer increase in membership fee to 
government's support. It is because membership fee can be used to carry 
out their own mission and goals with their self-determination, and to pay 
wage or operating costs, while money from the government is strictly 
controlled in using them; NGOs can't use the money to pay wage and 
operating costs, and have to report on the details of the expenses and be 
audited by governmental officials. In addition, membership fee can be 
generated from members until they will leave, while government's support 
are unstable because it can be stopped when they are eliminated from 
competition for support. Furthermore, there have been negative public 
opinion on government's support. These mean that benefits from 
membership fee is larger than those from government's support.  On the 
other hand, Costs for increasing government's support is thought to be much 
lower than those for increasing membership fee. So, we can think that 
increasing membership fee is an alternative with high costs and high 
benefits while increasing government's support is an alternative with low 
costs and low benefits. 
    We can think, NGOs that could endure this financial difficulty and/or laid 
stress on long-run financial performance would choose to increase 
membership fee, while NGOs that couldn't endure and/or attached 
importance to short-run performance would choose to increase government's 
support. In order to find what factor would have an influence on their 
choice, let's compare two groups; group 1 that didn't receive government's 
support and group 2 that didn't receive in 2002 but received in 2005. To 
exclude the amount of government's support, membership fee and 
advertisement revenue, total amount of  decrease in revenue of the 1st and 
2nd group are 41,205 thousand won and 39,171 thousand won which 
accounted for 12.8% and 15.4% of total revenue in 2002, respectively. So, 
two groups were expected to face a similar level of financial difficulty. This 
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implies that their choice would be more influenced by other factors than by 
the level of financial difficulty they faced. Concerning this, the fact that 
73.9% of group 1 have a principle not to receive government's support can 
be accepted to imply the importance of organizational principle or growth 
strategy to deal with financial difficulty.20)
    In case of the NGOs to adopt the strategy to increase government's 
support, decrease in membership fee can be explained as follows: 
government support was given at a cost of carrying out campaign or 
research project contracted with the government. It doesn't contain  wage 
and operating expense, so NGOs can't employ new workers to be necessary 
for carrying out the project. NGOs have to put their managerial capacity and 
human resource into the project. It caused shortage of managerial capacity 
and human resource to attract and manage members, which, subsequently, 
resulted membership fee to have decreased. It, also, might result in 
weakening of incentive for increasing membership fee. 
    
20) According to the 2nd survey conducted in 2006, 17 of 23 organizations belonging to the group 
answered "We don't receive any form of government support including local governments." on the 
question, "Does your organization have position of government's support?" 4 of remaining 6, replied 
'yes', but 2 of 6 replied 'No' on the question, "Did your organization request the government to 
support in 2005?".  Of the 81 organizations replied in the 2nd survey, 20(24.4%) organizations 
answered "we don't receive any government's support.", 57(69.5%) answered "We receive 
government's support in accord with our mission." , and 4(4.9%) said "We have no position about 
government's support." This question was not included in the 1st survey. 
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Ⅵ. CONCLUSION
      We can draw some useful policy implications to NGOs and the 
government based on these findings. 
      First, to overcome financial difficulties and enhance financial 
healthiness and stability, NGOs need to come up with fiscal plan with 
private donation, especially membership fee on focus. [Tables 1.6] and 
[Table 1.7] of Chapter 3 showed decrease both in business and project 
revenue. The government’s financial support generally increased in [Tables 
1.3] and [Table 1.5] but it would not be stable due to possible changes in 
political environment and policies. For instance, budge that the Ministry of 
Government Affairs and Home Affairs allocated to NGOs based on Law on 
Supporting NPOs has considerably decreased for the last three to four 
years by efforts of the National Grand Party. Also, under the government’s 
direct support system through projects, society will continue to debate over 
the financial support to NGOs, which, in turn, will have an negative effect 
on NGOs
     Secondly, as the press reports did not affect the volume of private 
donation, NGOs should have change their ways to communicate with citizens 
directly and continuously. This means they have to come up with a strategy 
to expand private donation based on strengthened internal capacity. Thus, 
special programs that enable NGOs to directly and continuously communicate 
with citizens should be developed. 
     Thirdly, as mentioned in Section 4, alternative growth strategy to 
overcome negative image on NGOs, to motivate citizens' participation and 
support, and to expand the base of support should be developed. Enhancing 
NGOs' social responsibility through inner innovation is the most important 
keyword in developing alternative growth strategies, I think. 
     As for the government, the current support policy is needed to be 
- 45 -
replaced with a policy that promote citizens' donation and make them 
choose the NGO to support. The side effects of current system are 
mentioned above. Therefore, the government should end wasteful social 
controversy over the government support, improve citizens’ trust to NGOs 
while nurture donation culture and encourage NGOs to increase their private 
donation through introducing alternative support policy. The best policy 
would be tax-credit of donation within certain limit. Next, current tax 
deduction system is needed to be further expanded and criteria should 
loosen. These measures are expected to lead NGOs to become more 
responsive to citizens' needs and demands thereby enhancing NGOs' 
responsibility and helping NGOs to grow in the right way.  
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Locati
on
 Total
revenue
Member 
-ship fee
Fundraising Business 
Program
Project Advertise 
-ment
Gov't 
support
Others
ADVO
Seoul
Mean 633500.00 188204.55 148000.00 72977.27 133636.36 10590.91 37681.82 43772.73
N 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
S.D 615178.855 266836.701 158208.422 188684.069 162067.753 23331.277 74568.209
100818.5
22
metro
politan
cities
Mean 154046.67 56673.33 34450.00 5066.67 20010.00 666.67 10350.00 7684.33
N 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
S.D 118320.648 36093.193 49491.265 9808.277 23820.946 2202.402 24833.636
11185.16
8
other 
cities
Mean 78264.44 30344.44 12264.44 8555.56 10624.44 1222.22 8125.58 10764.44
N 45 45 45 45 45 45 43 45
S.D 57821.926 19186.756 10455.059 15178.971 12037.690 3611.150 26760.526
26006.61
8
Total
Mean 227631.96 74290.72 49911.34 22087.63 41426.80 3175.26 15672.63 17298.25
N 97 97 97 97 97 97 95 97
S.D 372084.582 141822.711 95964.935 93232.966 92304.389 11953.042 43599.559
52732.89
5
SVC
Seoul
Mean 1650666.67 390333.33 182000.00 793333.33 159000.00 57666.67 23333.33 29000.00
N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
S.D 1234158.148 245907.164 74645.830 971665.237 153795.319 99016.834 40414.519
34394.76
7
metro
politan
cities
Mean 1372783.33 120000.00 123166.67 823833.33 157833.33 1000.00 46666.67 81500.00
N 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
S.D 1203321.554 141370.435 109073.217 899573.325 199289.153 2449.490 69761.498
111476.9
03
other
cities
Mean 568153.85 79692.31 47884.62 268000.00 37500.00 1153.85 67615.38 71884.62
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
S.D 315092.009 93170.439 71410.828 329116.747 32914.029 2794.225 89522.379
149456.8
16
Total
Mean 935213.64 133045.45 86704.55 491227.27 86886.36 8818.18 55863.64 68659.09
N 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
S.D 870510.312 163540.435 94272.737 648059.443 126565.617 36528.705 78451.863
126940.6
86
Total
Seoul
Mean 755560.00 212460.00 152080.00 159420.00 136680.00 16240.00 35960.00 42000.00
N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
S.D 756225.720 268020.441 149975.531 408545.787 158191.529 39205.952 70881.051
94954.81
4
metro
politan
cities
Mean 357169.44 67227.78 49236.11 141527.78 42980.56 722.22 16402.78 19986.94
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
S.D 656233.900 67136.997 69666.603 459839.878 94114.349 2211.801 37344.883
51549.53
1
other
cities
Mean 188067.24 41405.17 20248.28 66706.90 16648.28 1206.90 21935.71 24463.79
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 56 58
S.D 256805.934 50424.272 37181.627 186795.157 21627.259 3422.109 54200.894
76718.44
3
Total
Mean 358445.38 85152.94 56713.45 108819.33 49831.09 4218.49 23229.91 26793.53
N 119 119 119 119 119 119 117 119
S.D 568844.297 147132.894 96331.016 339502.763 100481.255 18935.287 53882.857
74370.29
4
Appendix 1
1.1  Financial State of NGOs (unit: thousand won)
1.1.1  2002(119 replied in 2002) 
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Locati
on
 Total
revenue
Member 
-ship fee
Fundraising Business 
Program
Project Advertise 
-ment
Gov't 
support
Others
ADVO
Seoul
Mean 736666.67 210972.22 173888.89 86972.22 158222.22 10055.56 43666.67 53222.22
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
S.D 633191.078 289058.028 164184.935 206802.724 168975.305 23483.341 81108.497
109706.8
58
metro
politan
cities
Mean 162125.00 61375.00 36083.33 5875.00 14750.00 833.33 10000.00 8416.67
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
S.D 129562.244 37414.032 54003.959 10694.625 17818.530 2443.566 26365.326
11732.21
8
other
cities
Mean 87291.67 36375.00 11229.17 9762.50 12854.17 625.00 3363.64 11387.50
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 22 24
S.D 43114.084 15539.046 8622.190 10621.832 13561.037 2122.601 11582.193
18344.39
4
Total
Mean 291606.06 93083.33 64628.79 29406.06 53189.39 3272.73 17187.50 21716.67
N 66 66 66 66 66 66 64 66
S.D 433488.883 166855.386 112995.850 111938.875 108840.736 12863.240 48584.038
60787.59
9
SVC
Seoul
Mean 1650666.67 390333.33 182000.00 793333.33 159000.00 57666.67 23333.33 29000.00
N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
S.D 1234158.148 245907.164 74645.830 971665.237 153795.319 99016.834 40414.519
34394.76
7
metro
politan
cities
Mean 1759233.33 226666.67 118666.67 1126666.67 202333.33 2000.00 16666.67 65333.33
N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
S.D 1157780.533 125288.999 70889.586 966247.035 263279.952 3464.102 28867.513
67062.16
0
other
cities
Mean 727000.00 96875.00 61812.50 354875.00 44062.50 1875.00 75750.00 107312.50
N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
S.D 271936.967 105830.643 87547.513 395458.301 39232.309 3440.826 104123.210
184836.0
16
Total
Mean 1146121.43 187571.43 99750.00 614214.29 102607.14 13857.14 51857.14 81535.71
N 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
S.D 856718.726 180696.394 91032.274 694615.132 142372.504 45610.149 83917.411
142746.2
06
Total
Seoul
Mean 867238.10 236595.24 175047.62 187880.95 158333.33 16857.14 40761.90 49761.90
N 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
S.D 774928.378 284964.192 153228.090 441492.693 163202.737 41720.841 76212.141
102097.9
46
metro
politan
cities
Mean 339581.48 79740.74 45259.26 130407.41 35592.59 962.96 10740.74 14740.74
N 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
S.D 616098.505 72442.865 60547.243 448059.685 96030.548 2518.875 26145.440
28283.71
7
other
cities
Mean 247218.75 51500.00 23875.00 96040.63 20656.25 937.50 22666.67 35368.75
N 32 32 32 32 32 32 30 32
S.D 311901.632 58452.076 47760.788 241762.456 25932.741 2513.672 61433.639
98717.58
2
Total
Mean 441146.25 109618.75 70775.00 131747.50 61837.50 5125.00 23410.26 32185.00
N 80 80 80 80 80 80 78 80
S.D 618180.877 172003.482 109769.628 373775.642 115929.124 22245.110 57441.203
83165.79
5
1.1.2  2002 (80 replied in both 2002 and 2005)
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Locati
on
 Total
revenue
Member 
-ship fee
Fundraising Business 
Program
Project Advertise 
-ment
Gov't 
support
Others
ADVO
Seoul
Mean 651072.61 202879.50 160426.06 22053.50 113000.00 41444.44 57333.33 51252.39
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
S.D 475858.012 257126.114 125923.389 35591.909 163362.462 101760.516 81445.037 77010.262
metro
politan
cities
Mean 185121.46 79304.13 34671.04 10960.87 17652.17 2086.96 18000.00 7291.30
N 24 23 24 23 23 23 24 23
S.D 106433.205 48880.974 31734.969 18374.012 35300.797 5775.442 23466.905 9892.004
other
cities
Mean 119854.50 46319.05 15904.32 11425.00 3590.91 9636.36 15577.18 9135.27
N 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
S.D 80125.014 26581.268 16828.643 26450.987 11794.507 36236.716 28180.755 13628.351
Total
Mean 293734.70 103092.78 63588.58 14292.27 39984.13 15968.25 28229.66 20495.54
N 64 63 64 63 63 63 64 63
S.D 344838.713 153165.478 92372.806 26993.356 100047.810 59750.008 50926.193 45922.445
SVC
Seoul
Mean 2167333.33 148000.00 1034000.00 374333.33 266333.33 35000.00 209666.67 100000.00
N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
S.D 799390.601 131730.786 983112.913 326184.508 461302.865 56347.138 113694.034 173205.081
metro
politan
cities
Mean 1748333.33 645666.67 447666.67 315666.67 142666.67 3333.33 140000.00 53333.33
N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
S.D 1445616.939 765463.476 469372.276 223236.048 137409.364 5773.503 150996.689 92376.043
other
cities
Mean 963750.00 66875.00 48125.00 550500.00 42000.00 142.86 226875.00 27875.00
N 8 8 8 8 8 7 8 8
S.D 465865.324 48976.489 101334.577 386780.115 108669.880 377.964 328098.608 26781.857
Total
Mean 1389785.71 208285.71 345000.00 462428.57 111642.86 8923.08 204571.43 48785.71
N 14 14 14 14 14 13 14 14
S.D 904192.898 389096.672 595262.450 340768.975 225235.469 27524.115 254431.407 84814.892
Total
Seoul
Mean 867681.29 195039.57 285222.33 72379.19 134904.76 40523.81 79095.24 58216.33
N 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
S.D 742946.133 241493.870 456339.998 166349.791 216765.058 95523.620 99571.534 91359.299
metro
politan
cities
Mean 358811.67 144653.65 80559.44 46119.23 32076.92 2230.77 31555.56 12603.85
N 27 26 27 26 26 26 27 26
S.D 649156.601 288145.752 187967.385 118910.716 65315.801 5673.149 61380.486 31524.727
other
cities
Mean 344893.30 51800.63 24496.50 155178.33 13833.33 7344.83 71923.27 14132.53
N 30 30 30 30 30 29 30 30
S.D 448447.012 34294.696 53793.588 308877.220 57005.797 31653.567 188656.396 19459.495
Total
Mean 490461.81 122218.77 114098.32 95771.60 53012.99 14763.16 59880.74 25639.21
N 78 77 78 77 77 76 78 77
S.D 643849.786 216107.944 280390.394 225223.672 132730.187 55494.112 133005.158 55421.094
1.1.3  2005 (80 replied in 2005)
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Locat
ion
 Total
revenue
Member 
-ship fee
Fundraising Business 
Program
Project Advertise 
-ment
Gov't 
support
Others
ADVO
Seoul
Mean 633500.00 188204.55 148000.00 72977.27 133636.36 10590.91 37681.82 43772.73
N 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
S. D 615178.855 266836.701 158208.422 188684.069 162067.753 23331.277 74568.209 100818.522
metro
politan
cities
Mean 154046.67 56673.33 34450.00 5066.67 20010.00 666.67 10350.00 7684.33
N 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
S. D 118320.648 36093.193 49491.265 9808.277 23820.946 2202.402 24833.636 11185.168
other
cities
Mean 80486.67 30344.44 11664.44 8555.56 10624.44 1222.22 8125.58 10764.44
N 45 45 45 45 45 45 43 45
S. D 58183.368 19186.756 10185.376 15178.971 12037.690 3611.150 26760.526 26006.618
Total
Mean 228662.89 74290.72 49632.99 22087.63 41426.80 3175.26 15672.63 17298.25
N 97 97 97 97 97 97 95 97
S. D 371693.708 141822.711 96062.398 93232.966 92304.389 11953.042 43599.559 52732.895
SVC
Seoul
Mean 3012000.00 650000.00 100000.00 1900000.00 170000.00 172000.00 .00 20000.00
N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
S. D . . . . . . . .
metro
politan
cities
Mean 1091800.00 84400.00 130600.00 558600.00 168000.00 1200.00 56000.00 71000.00
N 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
S. D 1103558.426 124405.788 120236.434 695647.037 221065.601 2683.282 73688.534 121272.421
other
cities
Mean 568153.85 79692.31 47884.62 268000.00 37500.00 1153.85 67615.38 71884.62
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
S. D 315092.009 93170.439 71410.828 329116.747 32914.029 2794.225 89522.379 149456.816
Total
Mean 834578.95 110947.37 72394.74 430368.42 78815.79 10157.89 61000.00 68921.05
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
S. D 818450.658 162083.132 89607.877 568637.378 124444.232 39278.582 82430.442 135278.546
Total
Seoul
Mean 736913.04 208282.61 145913.04 152413.04 135217.39 17608.70 36043.48 42739.13
N 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
S. D 779237.384 277916.061 154894.660 423219.067 158523.000 40648.984 73276.238 98625.194
metro
politan
cities
Mean 288011.43 60634.29 48185.71 84142.86 41151.43 742.86 16871.43 16729.43
N 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
S. D 515812.761 55034.951 70393.859 309250.911 94836.901 2240.573 37782.532 48396.955
other
cities
Mean 189791.38 41405.17 19782.76 66706.90 16648.28 1206.90 21935.71 24463.79
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 56 58
S. D 256119.610 50424.272 37226.387 186795.157 21627.259 3422.109 54200.894 76718.443
Total
Mean 327907.76 80294.83 53361.21 88961.21 47550.86 4318.97 23227.19 25753.71
N 116 116 116 116 116 116 114 116
S. D 520480.606 145217.652 95035.475 284423.928 98638.318 19169.994 54328.021 74524.457
1.2  Financial State of NGOs excluding 3 organizations
(unit: thousand won)
1.2.1  2002 (116 replied in 2002)
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Locat
ion
 Total
revenue
Member 
-ship fee
Fundraising Business 
Program
Project Advertise 
-ment
Gov't 
support
Others
ADVO
Seoul
Mean 736666.67 210972.22 173888.89 86972.22 158222.22 10055.56 43666.67 53222.22
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
S. D 633191.078 289058.028 164184.935 206802.724 168975.305 23483.341 81108.497 109706.858
metro
politan
cities
Mean 162125.00 61375.00 36083.33 5875.00 14750.00 833.33 10000.00 8416.67
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
S. D 129562.244 37414.032 54003.959 10694.625 17818.530 2443.566 26365.326 11732.218
other
cities
Mean 87291.67 36375.00 11229.17 9762.50 12854.17 625.00 3363.64 11387.50
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 22 24
S. D 43114.084 15539.046 8622.190 10621.832 13561.037 2122.601 11582.193 18344.394
Total
Mean 291606.06 93083.33 64628.79 29406.06 53189.39 3272.73 17187.50 21716.67
N 66 66 66 66 66 66 64 66
S. D 433488.883 166855.386 112995.850 111938.875 108840.736 12863.240 48584.038 60787.599
SVC
Seoul
Mean 3012000.00 650000.00 100000.00 1900000.00 170000.00 172000.00 .00 20000.00
N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
S. D . . . . . . . .
metro
politan
cities
Mean 1250000.00 191000.00 135000.00 615000.00 250000.00 3000.00 25000.00 31000.00
N 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
S. D 1060660.172 154149.278 91923.882 544472.222 353553.391 4242.641 35355.339 43840.620
other
cities
Mean 727000.00 96875.00 61812.50 354875.00 44062.50 1875.00 75750.00 107312.50
N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
S. D 271936.967 105830.643 87547.513 395458.301 39232.309 3440.826 104123.210 184836.016
Total
Mean 1029818.18 164272.73 78590.91 542636.36 92954.55 17545.45 59636.36 85500.00
N 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
S. D 800140.215 193871.654 84366.112 593810.117 144969.041 51327.115 92290.057 159721.476
Total
Seoul
Mean 856421.05 234078.95 170000.00 182394.74 158842.11 18578.95 41368.42 51473.68
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
S. D 806931.314 298424.393 160456.986 461947.044 164236.707 43602.135 79457.333 106887.983
metro
politan
cities
Mean 245807.69 71346.15 43692.31 52730.77 32846.15 1000.00 11153.85 10153.85
N 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
S. D 384497.492 58984.027 61185.468 198400.112 96844.904 2561.250 26573.208 15529.822
other
cities
Mean 247218.75 51500.00 23875.00 96040.63 20656.25 937.50 22666.67 35368.75
N 32 32 32 32 32 32 30 32
S. D 311901.632 58452.076 47760.788 241762.456 25932.741 2513.672 61433.639 98717.582
Total
Mean 397064.94 103253.25 66623.38 102724.68 58870.13 5311.69 23413.33 30828.57
N 77 77 77 77 77 77 75 77
S. D 559072.666 171421.776 108998.941 299651.352 114425.292 22658.947 58216.068 83795.763
1.2.2  2002 (77 replied in both 2002 and 2005)
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Locat
ion
 Total
revenue
Member 
-ship fee
Fundraising Business 
Program
Project Advertise 
-ment
Gov't 
support
Others
ADVO
Seoul
Mean 651072.61 202879.50 160426.06 22053.50 113000.00 41444.44 57333.33 51252.39
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
S. D 475858.012 257126.114 125923.389 35591.909 163362.462 101760.516 81445.037 77010.262
metro
politan
cities
Mean 185121.46 79304.13 34671.04 10960.87 17652.17 2086.96 18000.00 7291.30
N 24 23 24 23 23 23 24 23
S. D 106433.205 48880.974 31734.969 18374.012 35300.797 5775.442 23466.905 9892.004
other
cities
Mean 119854.50 46319.05 15904.32 11425.00 3590.91 9636.36 15577.18 9135.27
N 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
S. D 80125.014 26581.268 16828.643 26450.987 11794.507 36236.716 28180.755 13628.351
Total
Mean 293734.70 103092.78 63588.58 14292.27 39984.13 15968.25 28229.66 20495.54
N 64 63 64 63 63 63 64 63
S. D 344838.713 153165.478 92372.806 26993.356 100047.810 59750.008 50926.193 45922.445
SVC
Seoul
Mean 2096000.00 67000.00 163000.00 735000.00 799000.00 5000.00 327000.00 .00
N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
S. D . . . . . . . .
metro
politan
cities
Mean 940000.00 207000.00 177000.00 187000.00 154000.00 5000.00 210000.00 .00
N 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
S. D 509116.882 131521.861 32526.912 18384.776 192333.044 7071.068 127279.221 .000
other
cities
Mean 963750.00 66875.00 48125.00 550500.00 42000.00 142.86 226875.00 27875.00
N 8 8 8 8 8 7 8 8
S. D 465865.324 48976.489 101334.577 386780.115 108669.880 377.964 328098.608 26781.857
Total
Mean 1062363.64 92363.64 82000.00 501181.82 131181.82 1600.00 232909.09 20272.73
N 11 11 11 11 11 10 11 11
S. D 543558.695 81371.092 103310.212 363191.360 251058.885 3339.993 279273.147 25915.597
Total
Seoul
Mean 727121.42 195727.95 160561.53 59577.00 149105.26 39526.32 71526.32 48554.89
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
S. D 568986.651 251818.580 122376.961 167178.513 223546.141 99246.253 100459.704 75758.543
metro
politan
cities
Mean 243189.04 89519.80 45619.42 25044.00 28560.00 2320.00 32769.23 6708.00
N 26 25 26 25 25 25 26 25
S. D 250739.698 64506.835 49646.757 51956.104 64100.884 5771.482 62264.794 9683.660
other
cities
Mean 344893.30 51800.63 24496.50 155178.33 13833.33 7344.83 71923.27 14132.53
N 30 30 30 30 30 29 30 30
S. D 448447.012 34294.696 53793.588 308877.220 57005.797 31653.567 188656.396 19459.495
Total
Mean 406466.95 101497.91 66288.92 86667.74 53540.54 14000.00 58249.31 20462.42
N 75 74 75 74 74 73 75 74
S. D 464869.626 144382.944 93539.573 221585.312 134916.838 55680.886 134393.829 43394.755
1.2.3  2005 (77 replied in 2005)
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 Total
revenue
Member 
-ship fee
Fundraising Business 
Program
Project Advertise 
-ment
Gov't 
support
N Valid 119 119 119 119 119 119 117Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Mean 358445.38 85152.94 56713.45 108819.33 49831.09 4218.49 23229.91
Minimum 10000 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 3012000 982000 605000 2150000 640000 172000 300000
Percentiles
25 70000.00 20000.00 10000.00 .00 .00 .00 .00
50 130000.00 44000.00 20000.00 5000.00 16000.00 .00 .00
75 380000.00 80000.00 49000.00 23000.00 45000.00 .00 12750.00
 Total
revenue
Member 
-ship fee
Fundraising Business 
Program
Project Advertise 
-ment
Gov't 
support
N Valid 80 80 80 80 80 80 78Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Mean 441146.25 109618.75 70775.00 131747.50 61837.50 5125.00 23410.26
Minimum 27000 8000 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 3012000 982000 605000 2150000 640000 172000 300000
Percentiles
25 100000.00 30000.00 10000.00 .00 .00 .00 .00
50 150000.00 55000.00 25000.00 7150.00 20000.00 .00 .00
75 583750.00 102250.00 68750.00 30750.00 54000.00 .00 10000.00
 Total
revenue
Member 
-ship fee
Fundraising Business 
Program
Project Advertise 
-ment
Gov't 
support
N Valid 78 77 78 77 77 76 78Missing 2 3 2 3 3 4 2
Mean 490461.81 122218.77 114098.32 95771.60 53012.99 14763.16 59880.74
Minimum 10376 7800 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 3365000 1523000 2100000 1373000 799000 420000 985000
Percentiles
25 105000.00 34500.00 11500.00 .00 .00 .00 .00
50 206000.00 67000.00 29000.00 6000.00 .00 .00 9500.00
75 631250.00 111500.00 95750.00 51650.00 29500.00 750.00 62000.00
1.3  Quartile Analysis on NGOs' Total and Each Revenue
(unit: thousand won)
1.3.1  2002 (119 replied in 2002)
1.3.2  2002 (80 replied in both 2002 and 2005)
1.3.3  2005 (80 replied in 2005) 
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 Total
revenue
Member 
-ship fee
Fundraising Business 
Program
Project Advertise 
-ment
Gov't 
support
N Valid 97 97 97 97 97 97 95Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Mean 227631.96 74290.72 49911.34 22087.63 41426.80 3175.26 15672.63
Sum 22080300 7206200 4841400 2142500 4018400 308000 1488900
Percentiles
25 60000.00 20000.00 10000.00 .00 .00 .00 .00
50 108000.00 40000.00 20000.00 2000.00 11000.00 .00 .00
75 170000.00 67000.00 41000.00 10000.00 39000.00 .00 10000.00
 Total
revenue
Member 
-ship fee
Fundraising Business 
Program
Project Advertise 
-ment
Gov't 
support
N Valid 66 66 66 66 66 66 64Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Mean 291606.06 93083.33 64628.79 29406.06 53189.39 3272.73 17187.50
Sum 19246000 6143500 4265500 1940800 3510500 216000 1100000
Percentiles
25 89000.00 29500.00 10000.00 .00 .00 .00 .00
50 137000.00 52500.00 21500.00 4500.00 15000.00 .00 .00
75 252500.00 80000.00 49000.00 15500.00 41250.00 .00 5000.00
 Total
revenue
Member 
-ship fee
Fundraising Business 
Program
Project Advertise 
-ment
Gov't 
support
N Valid 64 63 64 63 63 63 64Missing 2 3 2 3 3 3 2
Mean 293734.70 103092.78 63588.58 14292.27 39984.13 15968.25 28229.66
Sum 18799021 6494845 4069669 900413 2519000 1006000 1806698
Percentiles
25 100000.00 32000.00 10500.00 .00 .00 .00 .00
50 164000.00 65000.00 26900.00 .00 .00 .00 4500.00
75 309500.00 100000.00 70866.25 15000.00 29000.00 .00 34250.00
1.4  Quartile Analysis on Advocacy NGOs' Total and Each Revenue
(unit: thousand won)
1.4.1  2002 (97 replied in 2002)
1.4.2  2002 (66 replied in both 2002 and 2005)
1.4.3  2005 (66 replied in 2005)
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 Total
revenue
Member 
-ship fee
Fundraisi
ng
Business 
Program
Project Advertise 
-ment
Gov't 
support
Others
A
2002
(total)
other
cities
Mean 80486.67 30344.44 11664.44 8555.56 10624.44 1222.22 8125.58 10764.44
% 37.7 14.4 10.6 13.1 1.5 10.0 13.3
Seoul/
metro
Mean 356892.31 112321.15 82490.38 33798.08 68082.69 4865.38 21913.46 22952.50
% 31.4 23.1 9.4 19.0 1.3 6.1 6.4
A'
2002
(replied 
in 2005)
other
cities
Mean 87291.67 36375.00 11229.17 9762.50 12854.17 625.00 3363.64 11387.50
% 41.6 12.8 11.1 14.7 0.7 3.8 13.0
Seoul/
metro
Mean 408357.14 125488.10 95142.86 40630.95 76238.10 4785.71 24428.57 27619.05
% 30.7 23.2 9.9 18.6 1.1 5.9 6.7
B
2005
other
cities
Mean 119854.50 46319.05 15904.32 11425.00 3590.91 9636.36 15577.18 9135.27
% 38.6 13.2 9.5 2.9 8.0 12.9 7.6
Seoul/
metro
Mean 384814.81 133556.73 88566.05 15830.80 59512.20 19365.85 34857.14 26591.29
% 34.7 23.0 4.1 15.4 5.0 9.0 6.9
1.5  Financial State of Advocacy NGOs according to the Size of City
(unit: thousand won, %)
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quartile  Total
revenue
Member 
-ship fee
Fundraising Business 
Program
Project Advertise 
-ment
Gov't 
support
2002
(total)
below  
60,000
Mean 40595.83 20270.83 8812.50 1775.00 4125.00 583.33 1458.33
% 49.9 21.7 4.3 10.1 1.4 3.5
below
108,000
Mean 87916.67 37666.67 15683.33 10641.67 14108.33 1583.33 4304.35
% 42.8 17.8 12.1 16.0 1.8 4.8
below
165,000
Mean 137625.00 50716.67 28729.17 8979.17 18825.00 958.33 14162.50
% 36.8 20.8 6.5 13.6 0.6 10.2
above
165,001
Mean 631720.00 183940.00 141480.00 65160.00 125160.00 9320.00 42291.67
% 29.1 22.3 10.3 19.8 1.4 6.6
2002
(replied 
in 2005)
below
80,000
Mean 54875.00 25937.50 10768.75 3893.75 7375.00 750.00 1250.00
% 47.2 19.6 7.0 13.4 1.3 2.2
below
134,000
Mean 110411.76 49352.94 24129.41 7970.59 15411.76 588.24 1875.00
% 44.6 21.8 7.2 13.9 0.5 1.6
below
250,000
Mean 161562.50 60843.75 22062.50 13875.00 22718.75 812.50 17600.00
% 37.6 13.6 8.5 14.0 0.5 10.8
above
250,001
Mean 818000.00 230352.94 195882.35 89470.59 162764.71 10647.06 46235.29
% 28.1 23.9 10.9 19.8 1.3 5.6
2005
below
100,000
Mean 71688.50 38022.50 11176.88 7209.37 625.00 .00 5625.00
% 53.0 15.5 10.0 0.8 0 7.8
below
162,000
Mean 127481.25 55412.50 26625.00 6956.25 11062.50 3062.50 14125.00
% 43.4 20.8 5.4 8.6 2.4 11.0
below
299,000
Mean 218375.00 92066.67 40312.50 24733.33 8866.67 3066.67 23125.00
% 42.1 18.4 11.3 4.0 1.4 10.5
below Mean 757394.06 226180.31 176239.94 18922.69 137437.50 56937.50 70043.63% 29.8 23.2 2.4 18.1 7.5 9.2
1.6  Financial State of Advocacy NGOs according to the Size of Revenue
(unit: thousand won, %) 
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 Total
revenue
Member 
-ship fee
Fundraising Business 
Program
Project Advertise 
-ment
Gov't 
support
2002
(total)
group1 Mean 68108.33 22325.00 14716.67 6958.33 12858.33 375.00 13391.67% 32.7 21.6 10.2 18.8 0.5 19.6
group2 Mean 121475.00 39091.67 21437.50 5541.67 23575.00 3416.67 11520.83% 32.1 17.6 4.5 19.4 2.8 9.4
group3 Mean 148137.50 57425.00 28958.33 22958.33 23666.67 1583.33 10869.57% 38.7 19.5 15.4 15.9 1.0 7.3
group4 Mean 563000.00 174160.00 130068.00 51660.00 103040.00 7160.00 26708.33% 30.9 23.1 9.1 18.3 1.2 4.7
2002
(replied 
in 2005)
group1 Mean 76062.50 25562.50 11768.75 3331.25 10218.75 562.50 12750.0033.6 15.4 4.3 13.4 0.7 16.7
grpup2 Mean 128823.53 49294.12 31117.65 7411.76 30470.59 58.82 2235.2938.2 24.1 5.7 23.6 0.0 1.7
grpup3 Mean 211250.00 71781.25 41825.00 35500.00 29000.00 1875.00 22142.8633.9 19.7 16.8 13.7 0.8 10.4
group4 Mean 732882.35 220470.59 169352.94 70205.88 139117.65 10352.94 32235.2930.0 23.1 9.5 18.9 1.4 4.3
2005
group1 Mean 99215.43 44740.00 18559.29 12739.29 2428.57 285.71 11785.7145.0 18.7 12.8 2.4 0.2 11.8
group2 Mean 166281.35 57541.19 25768.53 8937.50 5312.50 13000.00 26923.4134.6 15.4 5.3 3.1 7.8 16.1
group3 Mean 241201.38 80301.63 55173.38 21328.94 21625.00 2875.00 34937.5033.2 22.8 8.8 8.9 1.1 14.4
group4 Mean 630823.53 215470.59 146411.76 13988.24 120823.53 44000.00 36764.7134.1 23.2 2.2 19.1 6.9 5.8
1.7 Financial State of Advocacy NGOs according to the Number of  Media    
    Reports
(unit: thousand won, %) 
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CHAPTER 2
WAGE DETERMINANTS OF 
NGO-WORKERS
Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION
1. The Purpose of this Study and Background
      Korea's civil society has been rapidly expanding and developing, called 
"NGOs' renaissance", since 1989 when CCEJ, Korea's first NGO, was 
established. The 21st century is witnessing NGO's continuous growth in number 
and booming NGOs are regarded as the fifth power in Korea. However, unlike 
their glossy shape, the reality of NGOs is frustrating as far as their human 
resource management is concerned. 
     By the middle of the 1990s, most activists of NGOs came from the student 
and labor movements. At that time, the labor market of NGOs had some distinct 
features different from today. 
    First of all, there were extensive industrial reserves. Most activists who had 
been engaged in labor movement in 1980s went out as the initiative of labor 
movement passed into factory workers in the end of 1980s, and stayed jobless. 
Those who had worked as student activists in campus didn't jumped into plants 
to work for labor movement any more. As social supports for NGOs grew in the 
early 1990s, They started to take part in NGOs, activities as a NGO activists. 
Second, the wage level of NGOs is nearly zero or covering only the costs for 
activity. They chose their jobs not because of the wage basis but from 
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ideological preference. Third, as they already had been well trained and skillful 
enough to be activists before they worked for NGOs, the human resource 
development issues did not attract much attention. The primary concern of 
NGOs on HRD focused on how to recruit more capable people instead of how to 
educate and train them. Fourth, the recruitment of human resources was 
conducted through private networks instead of through public recruitment. 
    This trend has changed since the middle of the 1990s. In particular, the IMF 
financial crisis pushed NGOs into completely different situation.
    First, industrial reserves disappeared. Second, the number of NGOs has 
rapidly increased, taking advantage of the hospitable environment of the 
society. Third, as NGOs get comprehensive attention, NGO-activists have 
emerged as a type of job. While the traditional supply of worker decreased due 
to the disappearance of industrial reserves, the demand of labor rapidly surged. 
As a result, the recruitment method of NGOs was transformed into public 
recruitment. This change, related to the IMF crisis, resulted in the large inflow 
of inexperienced so called less skilled - workers into NGOs. It highlighted 
human resource related issues, on which had not been focused in the past. The 
huge influx of unskilled workers forced NGOs to pay more attention to the 
necessity of education and training. 
     Besides the lack of experiences, these new workers have more distinct 
features than their predecessors in that they have different world views and 
ways of thinking. Their preferences are unlike their seniors as well. They are 
interested in socially desirable works and self-realization rather than devotion 
to ideology. In addition, they had desire for a stable wage level to cover, at 
least, the cost of living.  
     On the other hand, NGOs did not address effectively new workers' 
expectation and demand. Instead of recruiting capable workers by raising the 
wage level to meet the essential cost of living, they recruited workers who 
endured low pay. What was worse was that they made little progress in 
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educating and training them. It is presumed that the high turnover rate of 
NGO-workers resulted from not meeting their expectation and needs mentioned 
above. 1)
    In recent a few years, the situation concerning NGOs' human resource 
management got worse. As criticisms against NGOs' activities have rapidly 
increased, the credibility and reputation of NGOs have been seriously damaged 
and attraction of NGO activists as a job has decreased. Many leaders of NGOs, 
especially located in small-medium sized cities, have said that It was ever so 
much difficult to recruit new workers.  However, serious social discussion, not 
to mention studies, on wages of workers or other HRD issues of NGOs are 
rarely found. 
     Among various issues related to human resource development, this essay 
focuses on the wage level of NGO workers, the gap between private sectors, 
and especially what factors have and effects on the wage level of 
NGO-workers. 
2. Research Method and Frame
     This study first explores the existing theoretical and empirical literature on 
the level of wages of non-profit organizations. Since Korean literature on the 
issue have not been found, this paper mainly depends on articles in foreign 
journals, which provide various theoretical and empirical methods and results. 
    For an empirical analysis on NGOs' human resource management,  the same 
nationwide field survey was conducted in 120 organizations and their workers 
twice. They belong to Solidarity Network, a representative network of Korea's 
NGOs. 
     The first survey on the state of NGOs and their workers in 2002 was 
1) In this survey, the turnover rate of NGO-workers is 9.7 times as high as that of the private sector in 
2002. The turnover rates of NGO-workers in 2001, 2002 and 2005 was 17.9%, 24.3%, and 19.5% 
respectively.
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conducted from March to April  of 2003.2) The survey on organizations was 
carried out through interviews with managers of the organizations. The survey 
on individual workers was conducted by visiting each organization, distributing 
a questionnaire at random, and collecting them. 120 organizations and their 344 
workers replied to the questionnaires. The second survey on the state of NGOs 
and their workers in 2005 conducted from June to July of 2006, was carried out 
through interviews, e-mails and telephones with mangers of the organizations 
and workers.  among 120 organizations, 81 organizations and their 224 workers 
replied to the second questionnaires. 
    This paper includes descriptive analysis on NGO-workers' wage and an 
analysis of explanatory variables influencing the level of wages through a 
regression with the data set from the field surveys.
     The content of the paper is as follows: In Chapter 2, introduces foreign 
theories and empirical studies on the wage level of non-profit organizations and 
the wage gap between profit and non-profit organizations. In Chapter 3, 
analyzes the wage level of NGO-workers, and wage difference between 
different types of organizations and wage gap of workers between non-profit 
and for-profit sector. In Chapter 4, I will try regression analysis to understand 
what factors influence the wage level of NGO workers. The final chapter sums 
up the result of empirical analysis and discusses desirable policy suggestions on 
wage issues to NGOs and the government. 
2) This survey was carried out by Yoon Soonchul(2003). 
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Ⅱ. LITERATURE REVIEW ON NPO-WOKER'S WAGE
     The western empirical studies on the wage-level of workers in non-profit 
organizations have focused on explanatory variables of wage difference 
between the non-profit sector and the profit one. Traditionally, workers in 
non-profit organizations are seen as receiving lower wages than workers in the 
profit sector. Until the middle of the 1980s, empirical studies on this issue also 
supported this.3)
     However, more precise later empirical studies show that the wage level of 
workers in non-profit organizations is not always low when we consider that of 
workers in the profit sector. Preston argues that, even though the wage level of 
workers in non-profit organizations is low, the wage difference between the 
non-profit and profit sector is negligible. Furthermore, the wages in the 
non-profit field are even higher than those in the profit one when we consider 
those in industrial areas in which the two fields produce similar social benefits. 
In reality, after studying the day care industry that produces little different 
social benefits between profit and non-profit organizations, he argues that the 
wage difference is not significant, especially in the areas exposed to a very 
competitive market with no entry barriers because of no government subsidy. 
What is more significant is that the wage level of workers in non-profit 
organizations is even higher when they occur in a less-competitive market due 
to entry barriers produced by a government subsidy.4) Laura Leete, after the 
analysis of the 1990 Census data, points out that the standard earning equation 
format on a wage difference between profit and non-profit areas shows zero or 
even a positive number.5)
3) Philip H. Mervis and Edward J. Hackett show that average wage of nonprofit workers is significantly 
lower than that of for-profit workers by using the Quality of Employment Survey Data, in their 
paper “Work and Workforce Characteristics in the Nonprofit Sector". Preston(1985) estimated wage 
differential of nonprofit workers at -0.15 by using small sample of nonprofit and for-profit workers.
4) Anne E. Preston, Compensation Differentials in the Nonprofit Sector: An Application to the Day Care 
Industry, PONPO Working Paper No.99, Yale University, 1985.
5) Laura Leete, Whither the Nonprofit Wage Differential? Estimates from the 1990 Census, Journal of 
Labor Economics, Vol.19, Issue 1, 2001, 
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     The mainstream explanation on the wage difference of workers in 
non-profit organizations  despite positive or negative numbers  divided into four 
groups.
     First, according to labor-donation model, this says that workers of 
non-profit organizations are willing to endure a low wage level because they 
find utility from the products whose nature is different from that of their 
counterpart, namely profit organizations.6) According to Preston's 
labor-donation model, non-profit organizations generate private as well as 
public benefits. In relation to the labor market, workers derive utility from wage 
and external social benefits produced by non-profit organizations. The workers 
who have a positive utility of producing social benefits are willing to trade off 
wages for social benefits on the given indifference curve. This trade-off 
corresponds to labor donation showing positive relations with social benefits. 
As workers have various preferences, each non-profit organization faces 
diverse potential labor pools. If the pools which consist of those who derive 
utility from social benefits are not as small as, at least, the needed number of 
non-profit organizations, the minimum wage of NGOs to hire workers becomes 
to low compared to profit organizations. In addition, since labor donation 
increases in proportion to social benefits, if other terms are the same, 
organizations providing more social benefits can offer lower wages.7)
     Second, the wage difference of workers in non-profit organizations stem 
from distinct features of companies, workers, and jobs between the non-profit 
and profit sector, which are various, observable, or impossible. In this theory, 
the wages of the non-profit sector may be higher or lower than the profit 
sector according to different aspects of concentration. Such instances are 1) 
service areas of non-profit organizations focus on labor-intensive industries; 2) 
the high employment ratio of women and minor ethnic groups to the total. On 
6) The labor-donation model was asserted by Hansmann(1980), Preston(1989), Rose-Ackerman(1996), 
Frank(1996).
7) Anne E. Preston, The Nonprofit Worker in a For-Profit World, Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 7, 
Issue 4, 1989, pp 438-443.
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the contrary, the wage level of non-profit organizations in competitive industrial 
areas is higher than the other due to the large size of non-profit organization
s.8) In line with this argument, some scholars interpret the wage difference of 
non-profit areas as an inter-industry phenomenon. According to them, such a 
wage difference disappears in narrowly defined industries or same industrial 
areas.9)
     Third, the wage differentials is derived from two peculiar aspects of 
non-profit organizations - non-distribution constraints and non-surplus 
accumulation constraints. Due to these constraints, the management level of 
non-profit organizations is less exposed to the pressure of cost minimization. 
As a result, they have some discretionary power in that they attribute profits to 
other places in the organization. When managers of NGOs obtain benefits by 
paying high wages to workers and themselves, part of the profits can be used in 
raising a wage level higher than the level of the market.
     Finally, government policies such as tax deduction, subsidy, or regulation 
immunity produce rents. These rents can increase wages through retribution of 
the part of profits to workers under the non-distribution constraints.10) 
8) Rose-Ackerman, Susan, Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory, Journal of Economic Literature 
34 (June 1996). 701-728.
9) The empirical evidence to support this opinion are weak. Weisbrod(1983) compares labor-market 
experiences of for-profit lawyers and public interest lawyers. Using multivariate statistical analysis, 
he finds that nonprofit lawyers earn up to 20% less than do for-profit lawyers. This shows that 
there is wage differential between the two sectors in the same industry,
10) This was asserted by Feldstein(1971), Shackett and Trapani(1987), Borjas, Frech, and 
Ginsburg(1983), and Preston(1989). 
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Ⅲ. THE STATE NGO-WORKER'S WAGE LEVEL & ITS 
   CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Basic Characteristics of the Sample
     344 NGO workers working in 2002 show the following features: 32.25 years 
old on average; 4.6years of average working experience at NGOs, 3.3 years of 
average working experience at current NGOs, and 893 thousand won of average 
monthly wages. According to the region, among 344 samples, 146 (42.4%) 
belong to Seoul, 89 (25.9%) to six metropolitan cities, and 109 (31.7%) to 
small-medium sized cities. From the perspective of gender distribution, male 
workers total 164(48.0%) and female ones total 178 (52.0%) among 342 except 
missing values. The education indicator shows workers have strong school 
backgrounds: 20 are less than high school graduates, 19 (5.5%) are two-year 
college graduates, and 248(72.1%) are four-year college graduates, and 
57(16.6%) are graduate school graduates.
     224 NGO workers working in 2005 show the following features: 34.43 years 
old on average; 5.42years of average working experience at NGOs, 4.05 years 
of average working experience at current NGOs, and 1,905 thousand won of 
average monthly wages. Compared to those in 2002, average age of workers 
goes up by 1.18 year, average work experience in NGO sector increased by 
0.82 years, average continuous service at current organizations grew by 0.75 
years, and average monthly wages rose by 202 thousand won. 
     According to the region, among 224 samples, 74 (33.0%) belong to Seoul, 78 
(34.8%) to six metropolitan cities, and 72 (32.1%) to small-medium sized cities. 
From the perspective of gender distribution, male workers total 98 (43.8%) and 
female ones total 125 (55.8%) among 223 except missing values. The ratio of 
female workers to total workers increased by 3.8%. The level of education is 
shown as follow: 13 (5.8%) are less than high school graduates, 13 (5.8%) are 
- 67 -
two-year college graduates, and 150 (67.0%) are four-year college graduates, 
and 48 (21.4%) are graduate school graduates.
2. The State of NGO-workers' wage level and Its 
   Characteristics11)
    According to [Table 2.1], Korean NGOs' workers received 893,023 won 
on average in 2002: 735,897 won to those between the age of 25 to 29, 
881,600 won to those 30 to 34, 1,002,410 won to those 35 to 39, and 
1,062,500 won to those 40 to 44. What is important is that the gap between 
adjoined age-groups decreases as the workers' ages go up. While the 
average-wage gap between the 25-29 and 30-34 age group is 145,703 
won, the gap between the 30-34 and 35-39 age group is 120,810 won, and 
the gap between the 35-39 and 40-44 age group is 60,090 won.
    [Table 2.1] shows that workers of service NGOs receives more wage 
than those of advocacy NGOs: 127,545 won (17.7%) in case of 25-29 age 
group, 130,229 won (15.0%) in 30-34 age group, 263,280 won (27.7%) in 
35-39 age group. Those who live in Seoul and 6 metropolitan cities receive 
more salary than workers in small-medium sized cities. 
    In terms of gender, there are no significant wage gap between female 
and male workers belonging to 25-29 and 30-34 age group. But female 
workers of the 35-39 and 40-44 age group receives significantly lower 
salaries compared with male workers belonging to the same groups.  
Average wage level of female workers of the 35-39 age group is lower 
than that of younger female workers of the 30-34 age group. And female 
workers of 40-44 age group receive no more than 20,000 won compared 
with those of the 30-34 age group. It looks strange, so additional analysis 
seems to be needed.12) 
11) These values are calculated from average values of wage groups from 600,000 won to 1,800,000 
won in blocks of 200,000 won, and the average values of 'below-600,000 won' and 'over-1,800,000 
won' group are set 500,000 and 1,900,000 won, respectively. The wage level is surveyed by unit of 
10 thousand won in 2005.
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Year Age Total
Type of NGO Size of city Gender
Service Advocacy Seoul & Metropolitan
other 
cities Male Female
2002
(overall)
(25 - 29) 735,897(78)
845,455
(11)
717,910
(67)
744,000
(50)
721,429
(28)
735,294
(17)
735,484
(62)
(30 - 34) 881,600(125)
994,118
(17)
863,889
(108)
901,087
(92)
827,273
(33)
879,710
(69)
884,483
(58)
(35 - 39) 1,002,410(83)
1,211,765
(17)
948,485
(66)
1,079,245
(53)
866,667
(30)
1,088,462
(52))
858,065
(31)
(40 - 44) 1,062,500(32)
1,340,000
(5)
1,011,111
(27)
1,073,913
(23)
1,033,333
(9)
1,170,000
(20)
900,000
(11)
2002
(replied 
in 2005)
(25 - 29) 733,333(66)
863,636
(11)
707,273
(55)
743,478
(46)
710,000
(20)
730,769
(13)
733,962
(53)
(30 - 34) 900,917(109)
977,778
(18)
885,714
(91)
908,235
(85)
875,000
(24)
906,780
(59)
889,796
(49)
(35 - 39) 1,052,459(61)
1,218,182
(11)
1,016,000
(50)
1,066,667
(45)
1,012,500
(16)
1,123,810
(42)
894,737
(19)
(40 - 44) 1,073,913(23)
1,200,000
(4)
1,047,368
(19)
1,061,905
(21)
1,200,000
(2)
1,216,667
(12)
940,000
(10)
2005
(overall)
(25 - 29) 961,025(40)
1,145,667
(9)
907,419
(31)
972,793
(29)
930,000
(11)
900,000
(4)
967,806
(36)
(30 - 34) 1,014,068(59)
1,186,364
(11)
974,583
(48)
1,030,000
(40)
980,526
(19)
1,036,897
(29)
997,586
(29)
(35 - 39) 1,240,299(67)
1,532,143
(14)
1,163,208
(53)
1,246,000
(50)
1,223,529
(17)
1,297,368
(38)
1,165,517
(29)
(40 - 44) 1,297,000(30)
1,650,000
(2)
1,271,786
(28)
1,400,625
(16)
1,178,571
(14)
1,411,111
(18)
1,125,833
(12)
[Table 2.1] Wage level of NGO workers in 2002 and 2005(unit: won)
 (  ), No. of Obs.
    The result of analysis only on workers who are belonging to 
organizations that replied to the surveys in 2002 and 2005, is shown to be 
similar to that on workers of total organizations except that their wage level 
is slightly higher than that of total NGOs.
    In 2005, NGO workers are shown to receive 1,905 thousand won on 
12) The wage differential between male and female workers is presumed to be because the status of 
female workers is lower than those of male workers. The OLS estimates in chapter 4, shows that 
the coefficient estimate of male-worker dummy variable doesn't show significant values in all 
equations in case of controlling status variables, but shows significant values significant positive 
values in case of excluding status variables. The result of the latter OLS regression analysis is not 
attached to this paper. 
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Age 2002*
nominal wage real wage
2005 increasing rate(%) 2005
increasing 
rate(%)
25 - 29 733,333(66)
961,025
(40) 31.0
870,698 18.7
30 - 34 900,917(109)
1,014,068
(59) 12.5
918,746 1.9
35 - 39 1,052,459(61)
1,240,299
(67) 17.8
1,123,711 6.7
40 - 44 1,073,913(23)
1,297,000
(30) 20.7
1,175,082 9.4
average: 961,025 won to 25-29 age group, 1,014,068 won to 30-34, 
1,240,299 won to 35-39, and 1,297,000 won to 40-44. Wage difference 
between service and advocacy NGO enlarged. Wage gap between two 
groups is shown to be 238,248 won (26.2%) to 25-29 age group, 211,781 
(21.7%) to 30-34, 368,935 (31.7%) to 35-39. Wage gap between workers in 
Seoul or metropolitan cities and those in other cities is shown to become 
close except the 40-44 age group that shows wide gap of 222,054 won 
(18.8%). In terms of gender, wage gap is observed newly in 30-34 age 
group that didn't show it in 2002, and other age groups show wage gaps 
still, which became close compared to those in 2002.
    [Table 2.2] shows the state of wage increase of workers in the 
organizations that replied to the first and second survey. According the 
table, 25-29 age group shows the highest wage increasing rate of 31.0%, 
and 40-44 group shows 20.7%,  35-39 and 30-34 age groups show 17.8& 
and 12.5%, respectively. Considering increase in consumer price which went 
up 10.27% during this period, the increasing rates of real income of 
workers are shown to be 18.7%, 1.9%, 6.7% and 9.7%, ordered by 
ascending age groups.13) 
      [Table 2.2] The State of Increase in NGO-workers's Wage
                                                          (unit: won, %)
      ( ), No. of Obs.    
13) Korea National Statistical Office, According to Main Economic Index, the increasing rate of 
consumers' price is 3.5%(2003), 3.6%(2004) and 2.8%(2005) 
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Age 
Service Group Advocacy Group
2002* 2005년
amount 
of 
increase
increas-
ing rate 2002* 2005
amount 
of 
increase
increas-
ing rate
25-29 863,636(11)
1,145,667
(9) 282,031 32.6
707,273
(55)
907,419
(31) 200,146 28.2
30-34 977,778(18)
1,186,364
(11) 208,586 21.3
885,714
(91)
974,583
(48) 88,869 10.0
35-39 1,218,182(11)
1,532,143
(14) 313,961 25.7
1,016,000
(50)
1,163,208
(53) 147,208 14.4
40-44 1,200,000(4)
1,650,000
(2) - -
1,047,368
(19)
1,271,786
(28) 224,418 21.4
   [Table 2.3] shows the state of wage increase in NGO sector classified 
by service and advocacy NGO. The increasing rate of wage in service 
group is higher than that in advocacy group in all age groups. This table, 
also, shows that the wage increasing rate of the youngest group is the 
highest of all, regardless of the organizational type. 
[Table 2.3] The State of Wage Increase in Service and Advocacy NGOs
(unit: won, %)
    [Table 2.4] shows the wage increase of workers classified by the size 
of cities where they lives. Two groups show similar level of increasing rate 
except the gap of 4.0% in 35-39 age group. This table, also, shows that the 
wage of the youngest workers rose the highest of all regardless of the size 
of the cities.  
    According to [Table 2.5], which analyze the state of wage increase of 
male and female workers, the wage of female increased higher than that of 
male workers in all groups except 30-34 age group. 
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Age 
Seoul & 6 metropolitan cities small-medium sized cities
2002 2005
amount 
of 
increase
increas-
ing rate 2002 2005
amount 
of 
increase
increas-
ing rate
25-29 743,478(46)
972,793
(29) 229,315 30.8
710,000
(20)
930,000
(11) 220,000 30.9
30-34 908,235(85)
1,030,000
(40) 121,765 13.4
875,000
(24)
980,526
(19) 105,526 12.0
35-39 1,066,667(45)
1,246,000
(50) 179,333 16.8
1,012,500
(16)
1,223,529
(17) 211,029 20.8
40-44 1,061,905(21)
1,400,625
(16) 338,720 31.8
1,200,000
(2)
1,178,571
(14) - -
Age 
Male Female
2002 2005
amount 
of 
increase
increas-
ing rate 2002 2005
amount 
of 
increase
increas
-ing 
rate
25-29 730,769(13)
900,000
(4) 169,231 23.1
733,962
(53)
967,806
(36) 233,844 31.8
30-34 906,780(59)
1,036,897
(29) 130,117 14.3
889,796
(49)
997,586
(29) 107,790 12.1
35-39 1,123,810(42)
1,297,368
(38) 173,558 15.4
894,737
(19)
1,165,517
(29) 270,780 30.2
40-44 1,216,667(12)
1,411,111
(18) 194,444 15.9
940,000
(10)
1,125,833
(12) 185,833 19.7
 [Table 4.4] The State of Wage Increase of NGO workers, According to the 
             Size of City  (unit: won, %)
[Table 2.5] The State of Wage Increase of Male and Female Workers
(unit: won, %)
    What is an unprecedented phenomenon in the results of the analysis, is 
that the wage increasing rate of the youngest age group is the highest of 
all groups regardless differences in characteristics of organizations. 
According to [Table 2.2], the increasing rate of this group is 31.0%, about 
two times as high as those of 30-34 and 35-39 age group. This 
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phenomenon can be presumed to be related to worsening of NGO-labor 
shortage. Labor shortage, which occurred from the middle of 1990s in NGO 
sector, is shown to have worsened for recent a few years. As we can see 
the result of analysis that average total revenue of NGOs have not 
increased during this period, NGOs would have serious financial restriction 
to raise worker's wage up to the level that meets the expectations of all 
workers.14) This phenomenon is assumed to be the result that NGOs raised 
the increasing rate of wage of younger workers higher than that of older 
workers in order to attract new workers, and to provide young workers 
with more incentive for continuous service. 
3. Wage Gap Between NGO- and For-profit Workers
      According to the [Table 2.6], the wage level of NGO-workers who 
graduated from university is much lower than that of for-profit workers in 
Korea. Their wage level is just 41.7% to 53.1% of that of for-profit workers, 
and  the gap of wage level between the two sectors increases as workers' age 
increases. 
    On the basis of the wage level of NGO-workers who are age 35 to 39, 
and can be expected to have a family of four, their wage level is just above 
the minimum living costs, calculated on the basis of a household of 4 
members, by the Ministry of Health and Welfare in 2002, 990 thousand won. 
    [Table 2.7] reports that wage level of NGO-workers has been kept the 
similar gap with that of for-profit workers in 2005. Compared to that of 
2002, wage gap of only 25-29 age group narrows by 3.8%, and those of 
other groups don't show significant changes.
14) Byung-Ok Park, A Study on NGOs' Financing and the Effects of Government's Support on It, A 
Thesis for the degree of Ph.D, KDI School of Public Policy and Management, 2007.
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Age Gender
Wage of 
NGO sector 
(A)*
Wage of 
NGO sector 
(A')*
Wage of 
for-profit 
(B)**
 A/B
(%)
A'/B
(%)
No. of Obs.
A A'
 25 - 29
Total 736,111 736,667 1,386,892 53.0 53.1 72 60
M 726,667 733,333 1,417,555 51.2 51.7 15 12
F 738,597 737,500 1,331,549 55.4 55.3 57 48
 30 - 34
Total 888,889 904,951 1,858,971 47.8 48.6 116 100
M 879,105 906,780 1,880,363 46.7 48.2 67 59
F 897,959 897,561 1,744,886 51.4 51.4 49 41
 35 - 39
Total 1,001,351 1,055,357 2,256,062 44.3 46.7 74 56
M 1,087,234 1,120,513 2,313,459 46.9 48.4 47 39
F 851,852 905,882 1,848,386 46.0 49.0 27 17
 40 - 44
Total 1,046,154 1,055,556 2,530,313 41.3 41.7 25 17
M 1,150,000 1,188,889 2,582,413 44.5 46.0 16 9
F 900,000 950,000 2,095,572 42.9 45.3 9 8
Age Gender Wage of NGO sector (A)*
Wage of for-profit 
(B)**  A/B(%)
No. of 
Obs. of A
 25 - 29
Total 970,029 1,702,523 56.9 35
M 900,000 1,727,579 52.0 4
F 979,065 1,663,745 58.8 31
 30 - 34
Total 1,026,852 2,224,732 46.1 53
M 1,035,926 2,267,211 45.6 27
F 1,025,000 2,054,583 49.8 26
 35 - 39
Total 1,251,967 2,715,752 46.1 61
M 1,307,714 2,774,371 47.1 35
F 1,176,923 2,301,379 51.1 26
 40 - 44
Total 1,320,400 3,069,025 43.0 25
M 1,453,333 3,143,902 46.2 15
F 1,121,000 2,460,587 45.5 10
   [Table 2.6] wage level of NGO- and for-profit workers graduating from 
                university, in 2002.
  *.  Data A and A'. calculating mean value by taking medium values of categories
      A. total workers belonging to NGOs that replied in 2003 
      A'. only workers belonging to NGOs that replied in 2003, and 2006
  **. MOL, Basic Statistical Research on Wage Structure, 2002.
 [Table 2.7] wage level of NGO- and for-profit workers graduating from 
             university, in 2005.                             (unit: won, %)
  *.  surveyed by unit of 10 thousand won
  **. MOL, Basic Statistical Research on Wage Structure, 2005.
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Ⅳ. REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON WAGE DETERMINANTS   
     OF NGO WORKERS
    In this chapter, using surveyed data of 2002 and 2005, I will try 
regression analysis on factors which influence wage differentials over 
organizations and individuals.15) In order to take individual and 
organization-related variables into consideration simultaneously, I integrated 
organizational observations with individual observations.
1. Modeling 
    I will make a regression model by adding some other organizational 
characteristics such as service NGO, the size of cities where NGO located 
and women's organization which show wage gap with the opposite type of 
NGO to variables which are used in standard wage equation model. And I 
will include NGO's annual total revenue as a variable to show the size of 
NGO into explanatory variables. 
Wage = f(Age, Carrier, Tenure, SCH, Gender, Marriage, Family, Status, SVC, 
Seoul/Metro, W-org, Revenue)
    Where, Carrier = years of service in NGO sector
            Tenure = years of tenure
            SCH    = years of schooling
            Family  = number of family to support
            Status1 = dummy variable(1 = workers over manager)
            Status2 = dummy variable(1 = workers over director)16)
15) Samples of organizations which replied in the 1st and 2nd surveys are analyzed. So, Samples of 
organization that replied only in the 1st surveys are excluded from this analysis.
16) NGO has the class of worker's position such as secretary general - director(in case of big 
organization) - manager - mere staff, in general.
- 75 -
            SVC    = Service NGO dummy variable
            Seoul/Metro = NGOs where located in Seoul and 6 metropolitan 
                           cities
            W-org  = Women's organization
            Revenue = annual total revenue of NGO
    Additionally, I will add each annual revenue from membership fees, 
fundraising, service-related program(business program + research project + 
advertisement rates) and their ratios to annual total revenue as independent 
variables in order to analyze what effects do they have on wage level of 
workers.17)  
2. Results of Analysis
    [Table 2.8] reports  the results of OLS regression analysis on the wage 
level of NGO workers in 2002. The coefficient estimates of age and square 
of age variable show stable positive and negative values at .01 significance 
level in all equations, respectively.  On the other hand, the coefficient 
estimates of schooling years and its square variable show significant 
negative and positive values at .1 significance level in all equations 
respectively. The coefficient estimate of carrier variable has an significant 
positive value, at least, at .1 significance level in all equations except the 
fifth equation. Increase by one year in Carrier is observed to increase the 
wage level by 3.3%(.05 significance level) in the 1st equation excluding 
organization- related variables, and increase the wage level by 2.2 to 2.7% 
in 2nd, 3rd and fourth equations that control organization-related variables. 
Wage differential by gender isn't shown, and a married worker is shown to 
receive more wage than a single by 10.6 to 11.6% at .01 significance level 
in 1st, 2nd and 3rd equations. In all equations including organization-related 
17) service-related revenue is composed of each revenue from business program, research project and 
advertisement rates. These types of revenue have the same characteristic as the compensation for 
providing service and goods. Because of small number of NGOs generating revenue from each 
source, these variables are integrated into one variables.
- 76 -
variables, a staff over manager receives more wage by 6.3 to 8.7% than 
that of a mere worker, and a staff over director gets more by 7.7 to 9.4% 
than that of a staff below manger, at least, at .1 significance level. 
    Concerning organization-related variables, the 2nd and 3rd equation 
show that there are significant wage differential of 13.9 to 20.4% at .01 
significance level between service and advocacy NGO, and of 11.5 to 13.6% 
at .05 significance level between women's and other organization , and of 
6.0 to 11.3% at .1 significance level between Seoul/metropolitan cities and 
other small-medium sized cities. 
    From the fourth and fifth equations, we can know that increase of 10% 
in annual revenue cause worker's wage to rise by 0.47 to 0.6% at .01 
significance level, and that the increase by 10% in the ratio of membership 
fee to total revenue results in increase by 2.54% in wage at .01 significance 
level.18)  Taking the fact that the ratio of membership fee shows the level 
of financial healthiness and stability of NGO to consideration, this results 
can be interpreted that NGO's financial healthiness and stability have 
positive effect on the wage level of its workers. 
    According to [Table 2.9], increase of 10% in membership fee, fundraising 
and service-related revenues cause worker's wage to rise by 0.5%(.01 
significance level), 0.46%(.01 significance level) and 0.18%(.1 significance 
level), respectively.
    On the other hand, we can know from [Table 2.8] and [Table 2.9] that the 
amount of government's financial support and its ratio to total revenue have 
no significant effect on worker's wage. From this result, we can't find the 
proof to verify the hypothesis mentioned in chapter 2 that government 
policies such as tax deduction, subsidy, or regulation immunity produce rents, 
which can increase wages through retribution of the part of rents to workers 
under the non-distribution constraints.
18) In case of including the ratios of fundraising and service-related revenue as explanatory variables, 
the coefficient estimates of these variables don't show any significant values.
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    [Table 2.10] that reports results of OLS regression analysis on wage level of 
NGO-workers in 2005, shows different features in many aspects from that of 
[Table 2.8].
    At first, we can find changes in age, square of age, schooling years and its 
square variables. The coefficient estimate of age variable that shows stable 
positive values in [Table 2.8], doesn't show any significant values in all 
equations except the fourth equation. And the coefficient estimate of square of 
age variable that shows stable negative values in [Table 2.8] shows positive 
values, at least, at .1 significance level in all equations except the 1st equation 
excluding organization-related variables from explanatory variables. The 
coefficient estimate of schooling years variable that shows stable negative 
values in [Table 2.8] shows positive values, at least, at .1 significance level in 
all equations, while the coefficient estimate of square of schooling years 
variable that has stable positive values in all equations in [Table 2.8] shows 
significant negative value at .1 significance level only in the 2nd equation. 
    We can think of changes in the values of the coefficient estimates of age and 
its square variable in connection with the results of analysis in chapter 3 that 
wage of the youngest worker's group goes up the highest of all groups in this 
period. And changes in the values of the coefficient estimates of schooling 
years and its square variable can be thought in connection with the fact that the 
level of a worker's schooling goes higher as a worker is older in this period.19)
Age 2002 2005 Change
 25 - 29 15.88(66)
15.75
(40) -.13
 30 - 34 16.26(109)
16.14
(59) -.12
 35 - 39 16.00(61)
16.34
(67) .34
 40 -  15.84(29)
16.38
(39) .54
Total 16.03(274)
16.17
(208)
19)  Changes in schooling years of NGO workers in 2002 and 2005
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    The second is about changes in the values of the coefficient estimates of 
career and tenure variable. The coefficient estimate of career variable shows 
higher positive values, at least, at .1 significance level in the 2nd and 3rd 
equations containing organization-related variables  than those in 2002. While 
increase of one year in career brings increase in wage by 2.2 to 2.7% in 2002, 
it causes increase in wage by 3.2 to 3.6% in 2005. And the coefficient estimates 
of tenure and its square variable that don't show any significant values in 2002 
show significant positive and negative values, at least, at .1 significance level, 
respectively, in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd equations. Because wage goes up as 
tenure is longer, we can presume from this result that NGOs  increased the 
incentive for continuous service and for workers with careers in NGO sector. 
     Thirdly, we can see changes in the values of the coefficient estimates of 
marriage, status variables. The coefficient estimate of marriage dummy variable 
that shows significant positive values, at least, at .05 significance level in 2002, 
doesn't show any significant values in all equations except the 1st equation that 
doesn't control any organization-related variables. The coefficient estimates of 
status1 and status2 variables fails to show any significant values while they 
showed positive values, at least, at .1 significance level in all equations in 2002. 
This result implies that there have been changes in terms of the wage 
arrangement criteria.
    The fourth change is that the value of the coefficient estimate of annual total 
revenue increased and those of organization-related variables became 
insignificant. I will compare the 2nd and 3rd equations in [Table 2.8] to those in 
[Table 2.10]. In case of [Table 2.8], the coefficient estimates of organization- 
related variables such as service, Seoul/Metro and Women's organization have 
significant values in the 3rd equations controlling total revenue variable even 
though their values become smaller. But, they don't show any significant values 
in 3rd equations controlling total revenue variable while they show significant 
values at .01 significance level in the 2nd equations not containing total revenue 
variable in [Table 2.8]. On the other hand, the value of the coefficient estimate 
of total revenue variable is shown to almost double in 2005, compared to that in 
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2002.  It seems to be because these three variables are correlated to total 
revenue variable, and influence of total revenue variable on wage level 
increased while influence of organization-related variables on it decreased.
     Finally, we can see some changes in the values of the coefficient estimates 
of each revenue from membership fee, fundraising, service-related business 
and government's support and their ratios to total revenue variables from 
[Table 2.9] and [Table 2.11]. The coefficient estimates of membership fee and 
fundraising variable have positive values at .01 significance level in both years, 
but their values become larger in 2005. Increase in the amount of membership 
fee and fundraising by 10% cause increase in wage by 0.82% and 0.63%, 
respectively, in 2005 while by 0.5% and 0.46% in 2002, respectively. But, the 
coefficient estimate of revenue from service-related business variable doesn't 
show significant value in 2005 while it shows positive value at .1 significance 
level in 2005. We can think of this phenomenon in connection with the result of 
analysis in chapter 3, that revenues of NGOs from research project and 
business program dramatically decreased while wage of workers increased in 
this period.20)
    The analysis result indicates that the wage system had changed during 
this period. 
    According the 2nd survey, 67.5% of NGOs adopted wage tier system, 
15% adopted annual wage system, and 17.5% had no specific system, in 
2005. As a question regarding wage system was not asked in 2002 survey, 
it is hard to make comparative analysis. 
    At firms, however, annual wage system was introduced since IMF-led 
bailout program in Korea meaning that few or very small number of NGOs 
adopted annual wage in 2002. In addition, the number of NGOs that has no 
specific wage system is deemed to be higher compared to 2005. It is safe 
to say that many NGOs shifted from ‘arbitrary system’ to ‘wage tier’ and 
20) Byung-Ok, Park, ibid.
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from ‘wage tier’ to ‘annual salary’ since 2002 given the fact that change 
from arbitrary system to annual wage system is difficult to occur in short 
term. Result of Regression Analysis, which I mentioned earlier, is attributed 
to change in criteria or their weight for determining wage in the course of 
shifting from one to the other wage system. For example, as labor shortage 
was getting serious at NGOs, incentives for workers with working 
experience in NGO sector and long-service were thoughted to be 
strengthened while consideration for living expense was thought to be 
weaker as change in value of the coefficient estimate of marriage dummy 
variable is indicated. 
    And, NGOs’ ability to pay wages had greater influence over wage level 
of workers since the coefficient estimate of amount of annual total revenue 
variable has doubled in value.
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1 2 3 4 5
AGE .099***(3.537)
.094***
(3.540)
.086***
(3.307)
.088***
(3.437)
.086***
(3.203)
AGE² -.001***(-3.119)
-.001***
(-3.260)
-.001***
(-3.029)
-.001***
(-3.177)
-.001***
(-2.945)
CARRIER .033**(2.257)
.027**
(1.978)
.022*
(1.686)
.025*
(1.952)
.021
(1.580)
CARRIER² -.001(-1.329)
-.001
(-1.110)
-.001
(-.843)
-.001
(-1.152)
-.001
(-.799)
TENURE -.029(-1.481)
-.016
(-.876)
-.015
(-.830)
-.024
(-1.322)
-.015
(-.804)
TENURE² .003(1.366)
.001
(.639)
.001
(.564)
.002
(.990)
.001
(.565)
SCH -.249*(-1.738)
-.232*
(-1.728)
-.253*
(-1.926)
-.260**
(-2.022)
-.258*
(-1.952)
SCH² .009*(1.941)
.008*
(1.864)
.009**
(2.016)
.009**
(2.124)
.009**
(2.042)
MALE .026(.916)
-.001
(-.024)
.013
(.488)
.003
(.093)
.014
(.496)
MARRIAGE .116***(2.844)
.111***
(2.860)
.106***
(2.805)
.094**
(2.530)
.106***
(2.734)
FAMILY -.026*(-1.904)
-.019
(-1.443)
-.020
(-1.558)
-.015
(-1.166)
-.019
(-1.432)
STATUS1 .042(1.177)
.063*
(1.882)
.078**
(2.343)
.083**
(2.568)
.087**
(2.556)
STATUS2 .024(.591)
.079**
(1.994)
.083**
(2.132)
.094**
(2.471)
.077*
(1.954)
SVC .204***(5.425)
.139***
(3.390)
.174***
(4.205)
.129***
(3.073)
Seoul/Metro .113***(3.485)
.060*
(1.703)
.056
(1.626)
.041
(1.101)
W-org -.136***(-2.981)
-.115**
(-2.546)
-.082*
(-1.817)
-.107**
(-2.041)
ln(Revenue) .047***(3.497)
.060***
(4.421)
.049***
(3.616)
Ratio of 
membership 
fee
.254***
(3.598)
Ratio of 
gov't support
-.056
(-.441)
Constant 6.414***(5.362)
6.408***
(5.703)
6.208***
(5.638)
5.981***
(5.548)
6.251***
(5.626)
Adj R² .354 .436 .460 .484 .449
Obs. 271 271 271 271 262
[Table 2.8] Results of OLS Regression Analysis on NGO-workers' wage level
                  in 2002 Ⅰ
Dependent Variable: ln(monthly wage)
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1 2 3 4
AGE .090***(3.470)
.079***
(3.046)
.093***
(3.585)
.099*
(1.939)
AGE² -.001***(-3.200)
-.001***
(-2.752)
-.001***
(-3.336)
-.001*
(-1.935)
CARRIER .026*(1.946)
.023*
(1.751)
.020
(1.465)
-.014
(-.428)
CARRIER² -.001(-1.129)
-.001
(-.937)
-.001
(-.709)
.002
(1.035)
TENURE -.021(-1.177)
-.019
(-1.028)
-.007
(-.386)
.081
(1.479)
TENURE² .001(.871)
.001
(.781)
.000
(.215)
-.009
(-1.468)
SCH -.251*(-1.926)
-.233*
(-1.789)
-.211
(-1.547)
-.078
(-.276)
SCH² .009**(2.026)
.008*
(1.884)
.007*
(1.655)
.004
(.394)
MALE .004(.135)
.021
(.776)
.007
(.275)
.089
(1.083)
MARRIAGE .101***(2.681)
.109***
(2.871)
.096**
(2.531)
.119
(1.199)
FAMILY -.017(-1.335)
-.023*
(-1.819)
-.024*
(-1.937)
-.005
(-.164)
STATUS1 .081**(2.452)
.089***
(2.657)
.075**
(2.229)
-.011
(-.140)
STATUS2 .088**(2.279)
.073*
(1.876)
.125***
(3.122)
-.110
(-1.001)
SVC .175***(4.719)
.151***
(3.991)
.176***
(4.088)
.030
(.292)
Seoul/Metro .060*(1.757)
.022
(.572)
.115***
(3.369)
-.096
(-.953)
W-org -.097**(-2.122)
-.108**
(-2.424)
-.128***
(-2.868)
-.156**
(-2.155)
ln(membership 
fee)
.050***
(4.048)
ln(fundraising 
revenue)
.046***
(4.537)
ln(service-relate
d revenue)
.018*
(1.808)
ln(gov't support) .041(1.220)
Constant 6.146***(5.623)
6.284***
(5.775)
6.109***
(5.350)
4.856*
(1.861)
Adj R² .468 .486 .475 .439
Obs. 271 263 251 58
[Table 2.9] Results of OLS Regression Analysis on NGO-workers' wage level
                  in 2002 Ⅱ
 
 Dependent Variable: ln(monthly wage)
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1 2 3 4
AGE -.012(-.884)
-.016
(-1.280)
-.019
(-1.638)
-.023**
(-2.010)
-.018
(-1.511)
AGE² .000(1.111)
.000*
(1.747)
.000**
(2.031)
.000**
(2.415)
.000*
(1.900)
CARRIER .026(1.265)
.032*
(1.704)
.036**
(2.007)
.044**
(2.471)
.035*
(1.940)
CARRIER² .000(.153)
-.001
(-.502)
-.001
(-.826)
-.001
(-1.211)
-.001
(-.776)
TENURE .061***(2.885)
.045**
(2.337)
.036**
(1.967)
.027
(1.451)
.037**
(1.981)
TENURE² -.004***(-2.638)
-.003**
(-2.192)
-.002**
(-1.862)
-.002
(-1.497)
-.002*
(-1.877)
SCH .216*(1.657)
.241**
(2.008)
.200*
(1.749)
.192*
(1.698)
.199*
(1.733)
SCH² -.006(-1.429)
-.007*
(-1.849)
-.006
(-1.604)
-.006
(-1.558)
-.006
(-1.589)
MALE .069*(1.952)
.041
(1.245)
.052
(1.634)
.046
(1.462)
.053
(1.652)
MARRIAGE .085*(1.709)
.048
(1.047)
.053
(1.209)
.045
(1.053)
.053
(1.220)
FAMILY -.007(-.407)
.005
(.364)
.004
(.262)
.009
(.630)
.004
(.268)
STATUS1 -.084*(-1.777)
-.045
(-1.046)
-.032
(-.764)
-.034
(-.805)
-.033
(-.784)
STATUS2 -.026(-.527)
.032
(.693)
.045
(.999)
.029
(.653)
.046
(1.016)
SVC .248***(5.844)
.078
(1.451)
.103*
(1.902)
.078
(1.440)
Seoul/Metro .109***(3.203)
.025
(.665)
.012
(.324)
.025
(.666)
W-org -.089**(-2.029)
-.063
(-1.512)
-.035
(-.827)
-.069
(-1.472)
ln(Revenue) .086***(4.726)
.106***
(5.493)
.086***
(4.699)
Ratio of 
membership 
fee
.232***
(2.797)
Ratio of 
gov't support
.038
(.282)
Constant 4.870***(4.628)
4.679***
(4.813)
4.085***
(4.379)
3.879***
(4.205)
4.081***
(4.362)
Adj R² .365 .478 .531 .548 .528
Obs. 198 198 196 194 196
[Table 2.10] Results of OLS Regression Analysis on NGO-workers' wage level
                    in 2005 Ⅰ
Dependent Variable: ln(monthly wage)
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1 2 3 4
AGE -.024**(-1.997)
-.022*
(-1.875)
-.020*
(-1.829)
-.012
(-1.108)
AGE² .000**(2.436)
.000**
(2.389)
.000**
(2.528)
.000
(1.286)
CARRIER .045**(2.438)
.036*
(1.904)
.027
(1.528)
-.010
(-.469)
CARRIER² -.001(-1.202)
-.001
(-918)
.000
(-.203)
.001
(1.049)
TENURE .026(1.327)
.032*
(1.684)
.020
(1.096)
.056**
(2.509)
TENURE² -.002(-1.400)
-.002
(-1.406)
-.002
(-1.280)
-.004**
(-2.516)
SCH .207*(1.778)
.197*
(1.687)
.411***
(3.402)
.519***
(3.383)
SCH² -.006(-1.621)
-.006
(-1.574)
-.013***
(-3.297)
-.016***
(-3.304)
MALE .046(1.430)
.063*
(1.901)
.041
(1.253)
.006
(.147)
MARRIAGE .036(.805)
.037
(.798)
.006
(.148)
.103*
(1.874)
FAMILY .009(.633)
.006
(.422)
.009
(.634)
-.012
(-.693)
STATUS1 -.034(-.785)
-.026
(-.613)
.055
(1.191)
.086
(1.653)
STATUS2 .026(.557)
.039
(.817)
-.018
(-.385)
.074
(1.241)
SVC .194***(4.530)
.136***
(2.643)
.231***
(4.697)
.207***
(4.073)
Seoul/Metro .038(1.017)
.003
(.073)
.111***
(3.097)
.046
(1.072)
W-org -.050(-1.154)
-.082*
(-1.924)
-.105**
(-2.332)
-.118***
(-2.863)
ln(membership 
fee)
.082***
(4.228)
ln(fundraising 
revenue)
.063***
(4.854)
ln(service-relate
d revenue)
.011
(.956)
ln(gov't support) .026(1.601)
Constant 4.214***(4.460)
4.555***
(4.813)
3.391***
(3.551)
2.326*
(1.857)
Adj R² .520 .545 .573 .579
Obs. 194 181 149 110
[Table 2.11] Results of OLS Regression Analysis on NGO-workers' wage level
                    in 2002 Ⅱ
Dependent Variable: ln(monthly wage)
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Ⅴ. CONCLUSION
    Policy implications drawn from the result of the study are as follow.
    First, social support for NGOs is necessary so that they can grow 
continuously on the premise that existence and activities of NGOs improve 
benefits of Korean society as a whole. As seen in the analysis result, so 
much low salary doesn’t lead NGOs’ workers to work long periods. To make 
comparisons between average wage of NGO-workers with 35 to 39 ages 
and minimum living expenditure of four family members announced by the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare, NGO-worker’s wages were higher by mere 
1.1% in 2002, and 10.2% in 2005 respectively.21) Moreover, wage difference 
with workers at for-profit workers hasn’t improved at all. Such a low wage 
level is thought to affect high turnover rate of NGO workers. Secretary 
generals who responded at survey also cited low wage level as an 
important reason to quit.22) It would be desirable for NGOs to address 
financial difficulties for themselves. Unless donation culture spreads very 
quickly, financial difficulties facing NGOs are not likely disappear in a near 
future as seen in analysis of financial status of NGOs.23) 
21) The Ministry of Health and Welfare announced that minimum living expenditure of four family 
members is 990 thousand in 2002, and 1,136 thousand in 2005.
              order of importance
cause of worker's leaving
1st 2nd 3rd sum of 
weighted 
%
low wage level 16 17 22 79.5 23.9
cloudy future prospect of 
NGO-worker as a job 8 15 16 54.5 16.3
cloudy future prospect of citizens' 
movement 11 13 9 50.5 15.1
discord with personal character 19 16 8 70.0 21.0
shortage of opportunity for 
self-development 1 2 2 7.0 2.1
other personal conditions 21 10 14 71.0 21.3
Total 76 73 71 332.5 100.0
22) On the question in the 2nd survey, "choose three causes of worker's leaving in the level of 
importance order." , Secretary generals of NGOs answered as follows. I weighted by 0.5 between 
each ranking. 
23) Byung-Ok, Park, ibid.
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Concept of ‘Social Support’ refers to assistance from individuals or social 
institutes such as foundations while excluding current system of direct 
support from the government. It could be introduction of tax-credit up to a 
certain level for donations made by individuals, or expansion of existing 
tax-deduction for donations or establishing an 'independent' private 
foundations by government's contribution. Introducing tax-credit or 
expanding tax-deduction could be a better alternative since it could be very 
efficient to spread donation culture and increase NGOs’ responsibility for 
citizens. Leaders of NGOs when asked cited introduction of tax-credit, 
expansion of tax-deduction, establishment of independent foundation by the 
government’s contribution as a desirable alternatives of social support in 
that order.24) 
    Second, NGOs should draw up financial growth strategy in a way that 
private donation including membership fee and fundraising may be expanded. 
The study illustrates that NGOs with larger membership fee, and its high 
ratio out of total revenue tend to have higher wage level, and NGOs with 
larger revenue from fundraising tend to have higher wage as well. In 
addition, amount of the government’s support and its ratio to total revenue 
have no effect on the wage levels of workers. This could be interpreted 
that NGOs’ financial soundness and stability could have an positive impact 
on workers’ wage level. 
    Third, regarding HR management, it is needed to downsize in terms of  
the number of workers in a way that they don’t find new replacement for 
           order of desirability
Gov't support policies
1 2 3 4 sum of 
weighted
%
current policy 4 7 7 35 69.5 13.6
tax-deduction 18 26 26 6 142.0 27.9
tax-credit 33 20 20 7 159.5 31.3
independent foundation by 
government's contribution 23 18 18 17 137.5 27.0
Total 78 71 71 65 508.5 100
24) On the question in the 2nd survey, "choose three alternatives for government's support to NGOs in 
the desirable order." , Secretary generals of NGOs answered as follows. I weighted by 0.5 between 
each ranking. 
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those who quit to the extent that NGOs could financially afford. Surplus 
labor costs by not hiring new workers could be used to increase remaining 
workers’ wage and meet their needs for self-development by offering 
opportunity of education. This may be a good direction for NGOs that 
heavily rely on human resources and are suffering from financial difficulties 
to go. 
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Age Type of NGO Location Mean N Std. Deviation
25-29
ADVOCACY
other cities 660.0000 20 166.70175
Seou/metropolitan 734.7826 46 141.76254
Total 712.1212 66 152.43173
SERVICE
other cities 875.0000 8 166.90459
Seoul/metropolitan 850.0000 4 191.48542
Total 866.6667 12 166.96942
TOTAL
other cities 721.4286 28 191.20891
Seoul/metropolitan 744.0000 50 147.30227
Total 735.8974 78 163.54384
30-34
ADVOCACY
other cities 758.3333 24 171.73454
Seoul/metropolitan 896.2963 81 224.96913
Total 864.7619 105 221.00337
SERVICE
other cities 1011.1111 9 145.29663
Seoul/metropolitan 936.3636 11 196.32996
Total 970.0000 20 175.01880
TOTAL
other cities 827.2727 33 198.86039
Seoul/metropolitan 901.0870 92 221.13323
Total 881.6000 125 217.16056
35-39
ADVOCACY
other cities 736.3636 22 259.20291
Seoul/metropolitan 1060.0000 45 183.89720
Total 953.7313 67 259.56161
SERVICE
other cities 1225.0000 8 260.49404
Seoul/metropolitan 1187.5000 8 533.01702
Total 1206.2500 16 405.74006
TOTAL
other cities 866.6667 30 336.65016
Seoul/metropolitan 1079.2453 53 262.64812
Total 1002.4096 83 307.22039
40-44
ADVOCACY
other cities 866.6667 6 294.39203
Seoul/metropolitan 1060.0000 20 264.37613
Total 1015.3846 26 278.12559
SERVICE
other cities 1366.6667 3 503.32230
Seoul/metropolitan 1166.6667 3 642.91005
Total 1266.6667 6 527.88888
TOTAL
other cities 1033.3333 9 424.26407
Seoul/metropolitan 1073.9130 23 315.10084
Total 1062.5000 32 342.42965
TOTAL
ADVOCACY
other cities 730.7692 78 213.99581
Seoul/metropolitan 908.4158 202 240.60137
Total 858.9286 280 246.39100
SERVICE
other cities 1067.7419 31 310.25484
Seoul/metropolitan 1034.4828 29 383.84880
Total 1051.6667 60 345.18070
TOTAL
other cities 826.6055 109 287.59610
Seoul/metropolitan 924.2424 231 265.10246
Total 892.9412 340 275.88987
APPENDIX 2.
2.1 The State of NGO-workers' Wage, 2002 (unit: thousand won)
    - for All NGOs replied in 2002
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Age Type of NGO Location Mean N Std. Deviation
25-29
ADVOCACY
other cities 623.0769 13 130.08873
Seou/metropolitan 733.3333 42 145.94798
Total 707.2727 55 148.89040
SERVICE
other cities 871.4286 7 179.94708
Seoul/metropolitan 850.0000 4 191.48542
Total 863.6364 11 174.77258
TOTAL
other cities 710.0000 20 188.90265
Seoul/metropolitan 743.4783 46 151.51410
Total 733.3333 66 162.98498
30-34
ADVOCACY
other cities 812.5000 16 178.41898
Seoul/metropolitan 901.3333 75 224.50747
Total 885.7143 91 218.87156
SERVICE
other cities 1000.0000 8 151.18579
Seoul/metropolitan 960.0000 10 189.73666
Total 977.7778 18 169.96732
TOTAL
other cities 875.0000 24 189.39262
Seoul/metropolitan 908.2353 85 220.50363
Total 900.9174 109 213.65228
35-39
ADVOCACY
other cities 881.8182 11 275.02066
Seoul/metropolitan 1053.8462 39 180.41787
Total 1016.0000 50 214.15234
SERVICE
other cities 1300.0000 5 282.84271
Seoul/metropolitan 1150.0000 6 625.29993
Total 1218.1818 11 483.35946
TOTAL
other cities 1012.5000 16 334.41491
Seoul/metropolitan 1066.6667 45 271.36021
Total 1052.4590 61 287.28996
40-44
ADVOCACY
other cities 1100.0000 1 .
Seoul/metropolitan 1044.4444 18 272.72529
Total 1047.3684 19 265.34761
SERVICE
other cities 1300.0000 1 .
Seoul/metropolitan 1166.6667 3 642.91005
Total 1200.0000 4 529.15026
TOTAL
other cities 1200.0000 2 141.42136
Seoul/metropolitan 1061.9048 21 326.30690
Total 1073.9130 23 315.10084
TOTAL
ADVOCACY
other cities 769.5652 46 223.97377
Seoul/metropolitan 905.0000 180 236.89684
Total 877.4336 226 240.13803
SERVICE
other cities 1013.0435 23 268.50486
Seoul/metropolitan 1008.0000 25 389.35845
Total 1010.4167 48 333.41533
TOTAL
other cities 850.7246 69 264.36560
Seoul/metropolitan 917.5610 205 261.18865
Total 900.7299 274 263.11639
2.2 The State of NGO-workers' Wage, 2002 (unit: thousand won)
    - for NGOs replied in both 2002 and 2005
- 92 -
Age Type of NGO Location Mean N Std. Deviation
25-29
ADVOCACY
other cities 866.2500 8 95.45942
Seou/metropolitan 921.7391 23 143.70589
Total 907.4194 31 133.71531
SERVICE
other cities 1,100.0000 3 100.00000
Seoul/metropolitan 1,168.5000 6 187.81241
Total 1,145.6667 9 160.37144
TOTAL
other cities 930.0000 11 142.47807
Seoul/metropolitan 972.7931 29 181.31019
Total 961.0250 40 170.82447
30-34
ADVOCACY
other cities 917.6923 13 156.90516
Seoul/metropolitan 995.7143 35 193.72943
Total 974.5833 48 186.18177
SERVICE
other cities 1,116.6667 6 116.90452
Seoul/metropolitan 1,270.0000 5 130.38405
Total 1,186.3636 11 141.58197
TOTAL
other cities 980.5263 19 170.99297
Seoul/metropolitan 1,030.0000 40 207.12934
Total 1,014.0678 59 196.12732
35-39
ADVOCACY
other cities 1,153.8462 13 224.96438
Seoul/metropolitan 1,166.2500 40 304.77976
Total 1,163.2075 53 285.26488
SERVICE
other cities 1,450.0000 4 191.48542
Seoul/metropolitan 1,565.0000 10 310.95730
Total 1,532.1429 14 279.84002
TOTAL
other cities 1,223.5294 17 248.19199
Seoul/metropolitan 1,246.0000 50 343.00592
Total 1,240.2985 67 319.96671
40-44
ADVOCACY
other cities 1,100.0000 12 307.48245
Seoul/metropolitan 1,400.6250 16 317.41600
Total 1,271.7857 28 342.70226
SERVICE
other cities 1,650.0000 2 70.71068
Seoul/metropolitan 0
Total 1,650.0000 2 70.71068
TOTAL
other cities 1,178.5714 14 346.80647
Seoul/metropolitan 1,400.6250 16 317.41600
Total 1,297.0000 30 344.56519
TOTAL
ADVOCACY
other cities 1,020.4255 47 240.28025
Seoul/metropolitan 1,098.0165 121 291.11172
Total 1,076.3095 168 279.31816
SERVICE
other cities 1,305.8824 17 315.17969
Seoul/metropolitan 1,426.5652 23 369.07068
Total 1,375.2750 40 348.19932
TOTAL
other cities 1,096.2500 64 289.01859
Seoul/metropolitan 1,150.4931 144 326.58849
Total 1,133.8029 208 315.80931
2.3  The State of NGO-workers' Wage, 2005 (unit: thousand won)
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CHAPTER 3
THE STATE OF NGOS' HUMAN RESOURCES & 
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE INCREASING RATE 
OF NGOS' MEMBERSHIP 
Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION 
1. The Purpose of the Study and Background
    Citizens' movement in Korea, prior to democratic movement in June, 
1987 had been driven by a few dedicated organizations which aimed to 
overthrow military dictatorship. Most of citizens had to be kept on the 
sideline by offering meager support since individual citizens’ involvement in 
these groups led them to suffer from unbearable pain. As such, the groups 
had to secure necessary financial resources by themselves while not being 
able to get it from citizens. 
    Starting the launch of Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice in 1989, 
many NGOs have sprung up under the motto of ‘Gradual Reform of Society’ 
via ‘Citizen’s Participation’ and ‘Reasonable Alternative & Peaceful 
Movement’. The new way of citizens' movement gained wide support across 
the society while NGOs experienced growth in quantity in the mid-1990 and 
won increasing influence on and trust from the society. This has led to the 
era of ‘Renaissance of NGOs’. Political and social burden of citizens due to 
their participation in NGOs was eased as Korea moved toward democracy, 
and high-level of education and economic growth of Korean economy gave 
citizens mental and financial rooms to participate in and support for NGOs' 
activities. Accordingly, citizens’ determination of participation and 
democracy, which was oppressed under authoritative government, took the 
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form of involvement in and support for NGOs. NGOs provided various policy 
alternatives to reform society, and in return citizens agreeing with the cause 
took part in NGOs as members and offered financial support. Virtuous cycle 
was created; advocacy and activities of NGOs generated friendly image and 
interest leading to citizens’ voluntary participation and support. 
    Around 2000, however, such a good cycle was broken down. That is, 
NGOs no longer created favorable interest, and consequently citizens turned 
their faces from NGOs. All this largely came from controversy arising from 
citizens' movement’s inclination toward political parties in short-term while 
in the long-run thinned critical mind to social issues due to political 
democratization, economic trouble and rising uncertainty from corporate 
restructuring and massive lay-offs in the wake of economic meltdown in the 
late 1990, and losing sense of freshness that NGOs enjoyed in earlier stage 
could be cited as reasons. A virtuous circle where ‘advocacy & activities’ 
results in friendly image & interest and subsequently ‘voluntary participation 
& support’ didn’t work any more requiring NGOs to develop new growth 
strategies. And yet, sincere interest and research on that matter was 
nowhere to be found among NGOs. 
    Growth strategy of NGOs, in particular a strategy to mobilize resource 
varied over time as I said earlier. Under authoritative government prior to 
1987, NGOs fighting on the frontline chose to secure necessary resources 
from within themselves. That’s because channel for resources to flow from 
citizens, recipients of social activities into NGOs was blocked. 
    During the 1990s, NGOs focused on garnering positive images or 
interests and raising social awareness via PR activities and policy issues. 
Such a hard-earned reputation took a vital role to increase membership fee 
from rising number of members, and revenue from cause related business 
program or research projects. As such, NGOs started to engage in 
profit-making business, expand their activity area in order to raise 
awareness and social cause, and diversified their funding source via 
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research projects, etc. This required additional workers to handle those 
tasks, and therefore regular workers working at NGOs increased in number. 
NGOs were thought to stressing external growth centering on ‘Policy and 
PR’ and ‘Diversification of funding source’. 
    On the outside, the most important changes surrounding NGOs for the 
last few years includes tarnished image and declined credibility in society. 
This has broken down the virtuous circle. On the inside, NGOs were 
struggling with depleted human resource, under-funding due to exacerbated 
external condition, and lack of management capability to weather the storm. 
‘Policy and PR’ didn’t lead to winning financial gain any longer, and 
Diversification of funding sources is believed to aggravate their financial 
burden meaning external growth strategy employed in the 1990s didn’t work 
out. 
    Main objective of this study is to develop growth strategy suiting their 
needs where existing growth strategy is not effective any more. The study 
is conducted focusing on analysis of resource mobilization by considering 
characteristics of the data surveyed. To this end, I will analyze factors 
affecting NGOs growth based on the data. Although sporadic efforts have 
been made based on political or social approach toward NGO's growth and 
development, any research hasn’t been done from economic point of view 
based on empirical analysis. Accordingly, the study doesn’t go further from 
experimental analysis. 
2. Research Method and Frame
    The data used in this study were collected from two times surveys in 
120 organizations that belong to the Solidarity Network, a representative 
network of Korea's NGOs. The first survey on the state of NGOs in 2002 was 
conducted from March to April, 2003.1) The survey was carried out through 
1) This survey was carried out by Yoon Soonchul(2003). 
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interviews with a secretary general or a staff over director of the organizations.  
The second survey on the state of NGOs in 2005 conducted from June to July of 
2006, was carried out through interviews, e-mails and telephones with a 
secretary general or a staff over director of the organizations.  Among 120 
organizations, 81 organizations replied to the second questionnaires. 
     The content of the paper is as follows: In Chapter 2, analyzes the state of 
NGOs and its change occurred in this period in terms of human resources. In 
Chapter 3, I will try regression analysis to understand what factors influence 
the increasing rate of NGO's membership by using Heckman Selection Model. 
The final chapter sums up the result of empirical analysis and discusses 
desirable policy suggestions on alternative growth strategy for NGOs.
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Location Mean N Std. Deviation
ADVO
Seoul 4655.00 22 7039.952
metropolitan 1317.48 31 2775.394
small-medium 336.64 45 252.311
Total 1616.34 98 4002.915
SVC
Seoul 9775.00 4 17827.390
metropolitan 4180.00 5 2619.542
small-medium 1190.15 13 1220.336
Total 3430.55 22 7646.458
Total
Seoul 5442.69 26 9127.875
metropolitan 1715.06 36 2897.349
small-medium 527.95 58 701.118
Total 1948.94 120 4886.297
Ⅱ. THE STATE OF NGO'S HUMAN RESOURCES AND ITS 
    CHANGE
1. The State of NGOs' Membership and its Change
    How many membership does a NGO have, in general, is regarded as a 
index to show the level of social reputation and influence of the NGO. And 
how much revenue does a NGO generate from membership fee, also is 
thought to show financial healthiness and stability of the NGO. In this 
respect, it is expected to give NGOs meaningful implications to watch the 
state of their membership and change of them. 
    According to [Table 3.1], a NGO has a membership of 1,949 on 
average in 2002. An advocacy NGO has a membership of 1,616 while a 
membership of a service NGO is 3,431. The size of NGOs' membership is 
shown to be related to the size of cities where they located: 5,423 in 
Seoul, 1,715 in 6 metropolitan cities and 528 in other small-medium sized 
cities.
         [Table 3.1] The State of NGO's Membership, 2002 (unit: person)
          statistics including total 120 organizations replied in the 1st survey
    In order to watch changes in membership of NGOs, I will analyze 
membership of only 81 organizations that replied in the 1st and 2nd survey. 
[Table 3.2] is the result. 
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LOCATION  2002 2005 Amount of
increase
Increasing 
rate
ADVO
Seoul Mean 5214.44 4781.25 -433.19 -8.3N 18 16
Metropolitan Mean 1575.92 1652.17 76.25 4.8N 24 23
Small-medium Mean 425.00 461.67 36.67 8.6N 24 24
Total Mean 2149.73 1993.33 156.40 7.2N 66 63
SVC
Seoul Mean 9775.00 11150.00 1375.00 14.0N 4 4
Metropolitan Mean 5000.00 5633.33 633.33 12.6N 3 3
Small-medium Mean 1540.00 1393.75 -146.25 -9.4N 8 8
Total Mean 4428.00 4843.33 415.33 9.3N 15 15
Total
Seoul Mean 6043.64 6055.00 11.36 0.1N 22 20
Metropolitan Mean 1956.37 2111.54 155.17 7.9N 27 26
Small-medium Mean 703.75 694.69 -9.06 -1.2N 32 32
Total Mean 2571.63 2541.41 -30.22 -1.1N 81 78
  [Table 3.2] Average Membership of NGOs according to Type of NGO 
              in 2002 and 2005 (unit: person)
    
    According to [Table 3.2], an average membership of 81 organizations in 
2002, 2,571, is larger than that of total 120 organizations in 2002, 1949. It 
means that an average membership of NGOs replied in both years is larger 
than that of organizations replied only in 2002. [Table 3.2] shows very 
interesting phenomenon. In case of advocacy NGOs, they show higher 
increasing rate of membership in smaller cities while service NGOs show 
the opposite phenomenon. Advocacy NGOs show increasing rate of 8.6% in 
small-medium sized cities, 4.8% in 6 metropolitan cities and -8.3% in Seoul. 
On the other hand, Service NGOs show increasing rate of 14.0% in Seoul, 
12.6% in metropolitan cities and -9.4% in other smaller cities. But, in case 
of service NGOs, it seems to be difficult to assume that the result shows 
the reality of them because of restricted number of samples. 
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Size of 
membership
Type of 
NGO
 average 
membership 
in 2002
average 
membership 
in 2005
Amount of 
increase
Increasing 
rate
below 500
ADVO Mean 258.15 411.25 153.10 59.3N 27 24
SVC Mean 250.00 175.00 -75.00 -30.0N 2 2
Total Mean 257.59 393.08 135.49 52.5N 29 26
501 - 1,000
ADVO Mean 752.95 795.71 42.76 5.7N 21 21
SVC Mean 940.00 933.33 -6.67 -0.7N 3 3
Total Mean 776.33 812.92 36.59 4.7N 24 24
1,001-2,000
ADVO Mean 1487.50 1412.50 -75.00 -5.0N 8 8
SVC Mean 1433.33 2300.00 866.67 60.4N 6 6
Total Mean 1464.29 1792.86 328.57 22.4N 14 14
above 2001
ADVO Mean 11577.78 9700.00 -1877.78 -16.2N 9 9
SVC Mean 13625.00 13925.00 300.00 2.2N 4 4
Total Mean 12207.69 11000.00 -1207.00 -9.8N 13 13
Total
ADVO Mean 2136.65 2019.03 -117.62 -5.4N 65 62
SVC Mean 4428.00 4843.33 415.33 9.3N 15 15
Total Mean 2566.28 2569.22 2.94 0.1N 80 77
    [Table 3.3] shows how do memberships of NGOs change according to 
size of their membership. While change in average membership of total or 
service NGO doesn't show a fixed pattern, that of advocacy NGO shows a 
feature that increasing rate of their membership decreases as size of their 
membership goes up. Advocacy NGO shows the increasing rate of 59.3% in 
the group with membership of below 500, 5.7% in the group with 501 to 
1,000, -5.0% in the group with 1,000 to 2,000 and -16.2% in the group 
with above 2,000. 
  [Table 3.3] Average Membership of NGOs according to size of membership 
              in 2002 and 2005 (unit: person, %)
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Size of 
Revenue
Type of 
NGO
average 
membership 
in 2002
average 
membership 
in 2005
Amount of 
increase
Increasing 
rate
below 0.1 
billion won
ADVO
(19/18) 363.16 357.78 -5.38 -1.4
Total
(19/18) 363.16 357.78 -5.38 -1.4
0.1 to 0.2 
billion won
ADVO
(29/28) 1274.48 1294.29 19.81 1.5
Total
(19/18) 1274.48 1294.29 19.81 1.5
0.2 to 1 
billion won
ADVO
(12/11) 1901.83 2372.73 470.90 23.5
SVC
(9) 1635.56 2205.56 570.00 34.8
Total
(21/20) 1787.71 2297.50 509.79 28.4
above 1 
billion won 
ADVO
(6) 12533.33 9466.67 -3066.66 -24.4
SVC
(6) 8616.67 8800.00 183.33 2.1
Total
(12/12) 10575.00 9133.33 -1441.67 -13.6
Total
ADVO
(66/63) 2149.73 1993.33 -156.40 -7.2
SVC
(15/15) 4428.00 4843.33 415.33 9.3
Total
(81/78) 2571.63 2541.41 -30.22 1.1
    [Table 3.4] shows how do memberships of NGOs change according to 
size of their annual total revenue. In case of advocacy NGO, the increasing 
rate of membership is -1.4% in the group with annual revenue of below 0.1 
billion won, 1.5% in 0.1 to 0.2 billion won, 23.5% in 0.2 to 1 billion won 
and -24.4% in above 1 billion won. This shows that increasing rate of 
membership goes up as size of annual revenue goes up, except the group 
with the most annual revenue. And It is opposite from [Table 3.3] that 
analyze according to size of NGO's membership. 
   [Table 3.4] Average Membership of NGOs according to Size of Annual 
               Revenue in 2002 and 2005 (unit: person, %)
   
    To sum up the results mentioned above focusing on advocacy 
organizations, which show clear patterns in change of their membership,  
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Membership increase rate is higher in organizations in smaller cities, with 
less membership and bigger annual total revenue. As for amount of annual 
revenue, however, the group of NGOs with more than 1 billion won 
witnessed negative increase rate of membership at -24.2%, a exception. 
  This phenomenon that increasing rate of membership goes up higher in 
smaller cities, less membership and bigger annual revenue can be explained 
by NGO's internal capability to attract new members; the level of 
relationship among members, staffs and executives, and the capacity to 
carry out programs. All other factors being equal, NGOs in smaller cities 
with smaller members can be assumed to have higher relationship among 
their members, which cause higher loyalty to the organization. Such a 
strong relationship among members serves as an important internal 
capability not only in collecting membership fee but also attracting new 
members. And, in terms of revenue, an organization with larger revenue is 
able to engage in more programs and activities, and therefore expand its 
contact with citizens directly or indirectly resulting to attracting more 
members compared to other NGOs under inferior conditions. 
  Second, 6 advocacy organizations that show decline in their membership 
at 24.2% are located in Seoul, and hold more than 2 thousand members and  
have annual revenue over 1 billion won. These organizations are guessed to 
be leading, well-known NGOs in Korean society. The decline in their 
membership can be explained from two aspects. 
  Firstly, according to publications by some media and research institutes, 
NGOs' social credibility and influence of NGOs rapidly declined in this 
period. It was mainly because of social criticism - more clearly from, so 
called, conservative mass media and political party - against NGOs. We can 
imagine that leading NGOs had been damaged more severely from these 
criticism, and this damage influence their membership. Such a negative 
image and declining credibility of NGOs triggered more severe damage to 
well-known NGOs in Seoul that took the lead in civil movement compared 
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to other NGOs, and subsequently influenced the number of members. 
Another possibility is number of samples. Huge change of one or two NGOs 
could have unproportionately affected average due to few number of 
samples available.
    Two histograms below show the number of organizations according to 
membership in 2002 and 2005, respectively. 
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Location  Regular Irregular
Total Male Female Total Male Female
Seoul
Mean 18.45 8.14 10.32 2.00 .77 1.23
N 22 22 22 22 22 22
Std. Deviation 20.179 8.919 12.077 2.449 1.232 1.688
Metropolitan
cities
Mean 5.60 2.90 2.70 1.20 .60 .60
N 30 30 30 30 30 30
Std. Deviation 5.256 3.556 2.277 2.987 1.429 1.714
Small-medium 
sized cities
Mean 3.36 1.24 2.11 .40 .29 .11
N 45 45 45 45 45 45
Std. Deviation 3.113 1.151 3.298 .720 .661 .383
Total
Mean 7.47 3.32 4.15 1.01 .49 .52
N 97 97 97 97 97 97
Std. Deviation 11.770 5.406 7.055 2.158 1.091 1.332
2. The State of Workers and Its Change
    - focusing on advocacy NGOs2) 
    According to [Table 3.5], an advocacy NGO has 7.47 regular and 1.01 
irregular workers on average in 2002. The number of workers according to 
the size of cities is 18.45 regular and 2.00 irregular in Seoul, 5.60 regular 
and 1.20 irregular in metropolitan cities, and 3.36 regular and 0.4 irregular 
in other small-medium sized cities. In terms of Gender, 55.5% of regular 
and 51.4% of irregular workers are female workers; The ratio of female 
workers to total, is 56.% in Seoul, 48.5% in metropolitan, and 58.5% in 
small-medium sized cities.
[Table 3.5] The Number of Workers in Advocacy NGOs, 2002 
    [Table 3.6] reports change of the number of workers in 66 advocacy 
NGOs that replied in 2002 and 2005. The number of workers decreases by 
15.6%, on average. In case of regular workers, as the size of cities is 
bigger, the increasing rate of number of workers is lower; 11.8% in 
small-medium sized cities, -7.7% in metropolitan cities and -23.9% in Seoul. 
In case of irregular workers, NGOs in Seoul and small-medium sized cities 
2) I excluded service NGOs from analysis because of small number of samples. Analysis result 
including service organizations is attached to appendix. 
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Location  No. of workers 
in 2002
No. of workers 
in 2005
Amount of 
increase
Increasing 
rate
Regular
Irregular
Seoul Mean 21.61 16.44 -5.17 -23.9N 18 18
metropolitan
cities
Mean 5.96 5.50 -.46 -7.7
N 24 24
small-medium 
sized cities
Mean 3.13 3.50 .37 11.8
N 24 24
Total Mean 9.20 7.76 -1.44 -15.6N 63 66
Seoul Mean 2.11 .61 -1.50 -71.0N 18 18
metropolitan 
cities
Mean 1.38 1.39 0.01 0.7
N 24 23
small-medium 
sized cities
Mean .42 .21 -0.21 -50.0
N 24 24
Total Mean 1.23 .74 -0.49 -39.8N 66 65
show increasing rates of -71.0% and -50.0%, respectively, while NGOs in 
metropolitan cities show increasing rate of 0.7%
  [Table 3.6] The Number of Workers of Advocacy NGOs' and Its Change     
               between 2002 and 2005
    To analyze change in the ratio of female to total workers based on 
appendix 2 and 3, the ratio of female is shown to increase in this period; 
from 56.9% to 60.5% in Seoul, 48.2% to 53.8% in metropolitan cities, 48.1% 
to 56.0% in small-medium sized cities, and 52.6% to 57.7% in total.  
    [Table 3.7] shows change of the number of workers according to the 
number of NGO's workers. While service NGOs don't show meaningful 
pattern, advocacy NGOs show a pattern that as a NGO with less workers 
shows  higher increasing rate of the number of workers; 25.4% in NGOs 
with 1 to 3 workers, 6.9% in NGOs with 4 to 9, while -10.6% in NGOs with 
10 to 19, and -35.7% in NGOs with over 20 workers.  
- 105 -
No. of 
Workers
Type of 
NGO
 No. of 
workers in 
2002
No. of 
workers in 
2005
Amount 
of 
increase
Increasing 
rate
1 - 3
ADVO Mean 2.24 2.81 0.57 25.4N 21 21
Total Mean 2.24 2.81 0.57 25.4N 21 21
4 - 9
ADVO Mean 5.19 5.55 0.36 6.9N 31 31
SVC Mean 6.67 6.33 -0.34 -5.0N 3 3
Total Mean 5.32 5.62 0.30 5.6N 34 34
10 - 19
ADVO Mean 12.50 11.17 -1.33 -10.6N 6 6
SVC Mean 15.67 21.50 5.83 37.2N 6 6
Total Mean 14.08 16.33 2.25 15.9N 12 12
over 20
ADVO Mean 41.63 26.75 -14.88 -35.7N 8 8
SVC Mean 37.00 36.67 -0.33 -0.8N 6 6
Total Mean 39.64 31.00 -8.64 -21.7N 14 14
Total
ADVO Mean 9.33 7.76 -1.57 -16.8N 66 66
SVC Mean 22.40 24.53 2.13 9.5N 15 15
Total Mean 11.75 10.86 -0.89 -7.5N 81 81
[Table 3.7] Change in Number of NGO-Workers according to the 
            Number of Workers
    To sum up change of the number of workers focusing on advocacy 
NGOs, First, the number of NGO's workers decrease by 18.3%. Second, the 
decreasing rate of irregular workers, 39.8% is higher than that of regular, 
15.6%. Third, the ratio of female workers to total became higher from 
52.6% to 57.7%. Last, the increasing rate of workers become higher in 
NGOs with less workers. The last phenomenon is thought to be result of 
downsizing due to worsening of financial difficulty in bigger NGOs which are 
assumed to have more workers than necessary number.
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Ⅲ. ANALYSIS ON FACTORS INFLUENCING THE 
   INCREASING RATE OF NGO'S MEMBERSHIP3)
1. Modeling
    In this Chapter, I will try regression analysis on the growth rate of 
NGO's membership by using Heckman selection model. The data used in this 
analysis is categorized into two groups; group that replied to the 1st and 
2nd survey, and group that replied to the 1st but didn't reply to the 2nd 
survey. So, increasing rate of membership of the latter group isn't observed. 
Because response to the 2nd survey isn't thought to be occurred randomly 
among 120 organizations that replied to the 1st survey, analysis only based 
on samples that replied to the 1st and 2nd survey, may cause selection bias 
problem of sampling. I, therefore, will estimate the probability of a NGO to 
reply by using probit model, based on all 120 samples, in the first step, and 
analyze factors influencing increasing rate of membership correcting 
selection bias by using OLS, in the second step. 
    The model that is used for estimation in this chapter is based on the 
model that employed to analyze ‘Factors Influencing Private Donation to 
NGOs’ as analysis model for membership increasing rate. Membership fee 
and fundraising consisting of private donation come from members and 
donors, as a result of attracting members who participate in NGOs activities, 
and sponsors who offer only financial support. Accordingly, factors affecting 
3) Growth of NGO, esp., advocacy NGO, is almost impossible to measure because their activity is 
mainly about immaterial things. But, there are some indicators, which show NGO's growth partly, to 
be able to measure their performance and growth by numerical value, such as revenue, membership 
and the number of workers, etc. I tried regression analysis on growth rate of annual revenue and 
the number of workers, but I failed to get meaningful results. It may be caused by small number of 
samples. So, I will introduce the result of  regression analysis on the growth rate of NGO's 
membership, which shows significant result.
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private donation could have the same or similar impact on the size of 
membership, and subsequently increasing rate of membership. 
    A branch of a nation-wide organization can be assumed to be 
better-known in a local community than an individual organization because 
of having the same well-known brand and synergy from nation-wide 
networking. And, amount of annual revenue, which show relation with 
increasing rate of membership in Chapter 3 is added to explanatory 
variables. The amount of revenue is expected to affect directly the scope 
and volume of programs that a NGO can carry out, which in turn have an 
effect on the size of membership in various ways. So, increasing rate of 
membership of a NGO can be indicated in a following formula. 
Increasing rate of membership 
= f(Member, Worker, News, Actyr, Seoul/Metro, SVC, B/N, Revenue) 
    where, Member = the number of members
           Worker = the number of workers
           News = the number of media reports
           Actyr = active years
           Seoul/Metro = NGO located in Seoul and 6 metropolitan cities
           SVC = service NGO
           B/N = branch or network organization
           Revenue = amount of annual total revenue
    The number of media reports is calculated from January 1 to December 
31 for a certain year based on news reports of KINDS by group featured 
on national daily newspapers including Donga Daily, Gyeunghang Daily, 
Munhwa ilbo, Hangyeorae Daily, Hankook Ilbo, and Kookmin Daily. The 
active period is the months which was subtracted from their foundation date 
based on June 2002 and June 2005 respectively. 
    Finally, I will replace annual revenue variable with each revenue from 
membership fee, fundraising, service-related program and government's 
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support in turn, in order to analyze what kind of revenue has an effect on 
increasing rate of membership. 
 
    Analysis model on the possibility that a organization would respond to 
the 2nd survey is formed in a following inference. 
    This analysis use two groups of samples; 81 organizations which both 
replied in 2002 and 2005, and 39 organizations which responded in 2002 
only. Among the 39, which didn’t respond 2005, 5 organizations were 
dissolved or in a situation where serious internal problems are going on, 
and the rest of 34 refused to answer. Current status on financial and human 
resources of these 39 organizations is attached in appendix 4, which shows 
their average size of membership, the number of workers and annual 
revenue smaller than those of NGOs replied to both surveys. 
    Whether or not disclosing financial condition and human resources is 
expected to reflect to some extent the level of a organization's openness 
and transparency. So, the probability of response is assumed to be affected 
by factors influencing an organization's openness and transparency such as 
the size of organization, name value, size of city where a NGO located, type 
of NGO – individual organization vs a branch of nationwide organization or 
network of organizations. 
    An organization with a bigger size and higher reputation located in 
Seoul or metropolitan cities are more likely to be scrutinized by the media 
or citizens compared to those who don’t, meaning bigger ones are thought 
to be under greater pressures on openness and transparency. In addition, a 
branch of a nationwide organization compared to individual one is thought to 
be more open and transparent because they are better known to citizens 
and the media and more exposed to public scrutiny, and because they are 
required to maintain a certain level of quality in finance and HR 
management by their headquarters. And, a network organization consisting 
of individual organizations is assumed to have high level of openness and 
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transparency because it rely financially on membership fee, thus having 
simple revenue structure, and its members, individual NGOs, have strong 
capability to monitor its financing. Amount of annual revenue, a variable 
showing size of an NGO could affect openness and transparency in other 
way. That’s because many small-sized NGOs can’t afford to have a 
full-time staff to take exclusive charge of the account, and let a staff to 
take a charge of receipt and payment along with other responsibilities. As 
NGOs, which don’t manage accounting task well, tend to be passive in 
disclosing financial data, their financial capacity could affect their openness 
and transparency. 
    Number of members and workers are selected as variables showing size 
of an organization, and the number of media reports and active years are 
selected as variables for famousness. Accordingly, likelihood that NGOs 
answered in 2002 could answer in 2005 could be indicated in the following 
formula. 
Response 
= f (Member, Worker, News, Actyr, Seoul/Metro, SVC, B/N, Revenue) 
    And, I will replace annual revenue variable with each revenue from 
membership fee, fundraising, service-related program and government's 
support in turn, in order to analyze what kind of revenue has an effect on 
the probability of response. As a dependent variable to show increasing rate 
of membership, I will choose the value to subtract the value of natural 
logarithm of membership in 2002, from that in 2005. As a dependent 
variable for selection function, a dummy variable of 'response = 1, 
non-response = 0' is selected. 
2. Results
1) Results of Analysis on Factors Influencing the Probability of Response
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    According to [Table 3.8], the coefficient estimates of branch/network 
and the number of media reports variables show positive values at .05 
significance level in all equations except the fifth. Amount of annual revenue 
variable shows positive influence on the probability of response at .05 
significance level in the 1st and 2nd equation. The coefficient estimate of 
service NGO has negative value at .1 significance level in the 2nd and 3rd 
equation which active year variable is excluded from explanatory variables. 
This is thought to be because Service NGO variable is correlated with 
active year variable. Concerning all kind of revenue, only membership fee 
variable shows positive value at .1 significance level while other type of 
revenue variable don't show significant values. 
    To sum up the results, type of organization, the number of media 
reports and the amount of annual total revenue, esp., membership fee have 
an positive effect on the probability of response. In case of service NGO, 
the number of samples is too small to draw a significant conclusion. 
2) Results of Analysis on Factors Affecting Increasing Rate of Membership
    [Table 3.8] reports that only two variables, membership and total 
revenue, have significant effect on increasing rate of membership. 
Membership variable shows negative value at .01 significance level in all 
equations except the fifth. This means that a NGO with smaller membership 
shows higher increasing rate of membership while a NGO with bigger 
membership shows lower increasing rate. On the other hand, annual total 
revenue variable shows positive value, at least, at .1 significance level in 
the 1st, 2nd and 3rd equations. These results are consistent with the 
results of descriptive analysis in Chapter 2. 
    In case of replacing amount of annual total revenue variable with 
amount of revenue from each funding sources, only amount of membership 
fee shows positive value at .1 significance level while other variables don't 
show significant values.
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1 2 3 4 5
Growth Rate
Function
SVC -.362(-1.02)
-.524
(-.98)
-.548
(-1.22)
-.049
(-.20)
-.119
(-.37)
Seoul/Metro .036(0.17)
.026
(.10)
Branch/Network .366(1.63)
.423
(1.33)
.396
(1.27)
.315
(1.55)
.503**
(2.33)
ln(News) .146(1.54)
.162
(1.26)
.158
(1.28)
.152*
(1.82)
.149
(1.36)
ln(Actyr) -.080(-0.63)
ln(Member) -.378***(-3.00)
-.383**
(-2.48)
-.386***
(-2.89)
-.378***
(-3.48)
.04
(.23)
ln(Worker) -.186(-0.89)
-.218
(-.77)
-.183
(-.73)
.160
(1.44)
-.377
(-1.62)
ln(Revenue) .55**(2.08)
.593*
(1.67)
.574*
(1.86)
ln(membership 
fee)
.220*
(1.66)
ln(gov't support) .162(1.30)
Constant -4.413(-1.45)
-5.278
(-1.19)
-5.01
(-1.31)
-1.02
(-.68)
-1.938
(-1.16)
Selection
Function
SVC -.989(-1.53)
-1.197*
(-1.95)
-.935*
(-1.65)
-.423
(-.79)
-4.173*
(-1.91)
Seoul/Metro -.600(-1.63)
-.455
(-1.29)
Branch/Network .686**(2.04)
.692**
(2.08)
.698**
(2.12)
.736**
(2.19)
2.561*
(1.78)
ln(News) .283**(2.16)
.257**
(2.03)
.261**
(2.09)
.301**
(2.29)
.605
(1.25)
ln(Actyr) -.357*(-1.65)
ln(Member) .298(1.28)
.236
(1.06)
.149
(.71)
.049
(.20)
1.722*
(1.83)
ln(Worker) -.561(-1.40)
-.504
(-1.29)
-.452
(-1.16)
.055
(.21)
.752
(.67)
ln(Revenue) .920**(2.12)
.754**
(1.85)
.637
(1.61)
ln(membership 
fee)
.402*
(1.75)
ln(gov't support) -.183(-.25)
Constant -10.537**(-2.44)
-9.807**
(-2.37)
-8.225**
(-2.09)
-5.26***
(-2.71)
-11.200
(-1.50)
rho 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .658
lambda .612 .803 .739 .558 .241
No. of obs. 101 101 101 100 34
Censored obs. 32 32 32 31 14
[Table 3.8] Results of Regression Analysis on Increasing rate of NGO's 
            Membership, by using Heckman Selection Model (Two-stage) 
Notes: Robust z statistics in parentheses, ***: p<.01, **: p<.05, *: p<.1
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Ⅳ. CONCLUSION 
   The analysis results show significance of NGOs’ financial strategy 
centering on membership fee under current external situation. 
   Membership fee is generated from attracting and managing members. 
Unlike the late 1980s and early 1990s, at the present stage where social 
concern about NGOs and their credibility and influence has been 
deteriorating, just indirect contact with citizens via media exposure doesn’t 
automatically lead to recruitment of new members. 
   Under this condition, therefore, increase in membership and membership 
fee can mainly be occurred when; firstly a NGO carry out activities and 
programs to meet citizens' real needs and stimulate them to have favorable 
image and concern about NGO, secondly try to get and keep in touch with 
citizens and develop programs to make it possible in on- and off-line space, 
thirdly make faithful relation with them which can be formed through 
continuous and sincere organizational efforts. 
    This strategy, however, is not easy to be implemented because it takes 
huge amount of resources and time, and because the results can be 
obtained only in the mid-to-long run even though a NGO employ 
membership-centered growth strategy or financial strategy centering on 
membership fee, and invest huge amount of money and time. Due to the 
difficulties, many organizations choose to engage in moneymaking business 
or depend on winning projects, which lead to tangible results soon or adopt 
financial strategy relying on government’s financial support. But, growth 
strategy focusing on profit-making business or projects - financial support 
from the government is included here as it takes form as project - has 
critical disadvantages. 
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   The first is about unstability of funding. Revenue coming from research 
projects already has been significantly decreased, and the trend is expected 
to continue for the years to come. Profits from business are shown to 
reduce significantly from 2002 to 2005. Financial support from the 
government is very changeable based on policy shift. Accordingly, NGOs 
heavily relying on profit-making business or research projects are likely to 
be exposed to financial trouble depending on sudden changes from outside. 
   Second, profit-making business or projects are given priority with limited 
human resources while recruiting and managing members are pushed to the 
back burner. This has led to declining membership fee out of total revenue 
undermining financial healthiness and stability. Third, NGOs, which got 
accustomed to receive larger funding have less interest in small amount of 
membership fee and fundraising from multiple members. As a result, NGOs 
could lose its identity by responding to more sensitively to needs of big 
money donors than those of ordinary citizens. 
    The result of analysis on NGO's finance4) shows the probability that 
NGOs have been dividing into two categories, as financial difficulty of NGOs 
are getting serious; one group centers on membership fee and private 
donation from citizens, and the other focuses on project including 
government’s support.  This is very worrisome situation. The study also 
reveals that the amount of revenue from membership fee affects increasing 
rate of membership. Amount of membership fee and its ratio to total 
revenue also affects wage level of NGOs’ workers. In addition, private 
donation including membership fee not only prevents NGOs from 
undermining their independence and but also makes them more responsive 
to citizens’ demand, a source of membership fee. Finally, NGOs, which have 
relied on membership fee and private donation, are shown to manage 
worsening financial difficulty better than those that didn’t. 
4) Byung-Ok, Park, A Study on NGO's Financing and the Effects of Government's Support on It, A 
Thesis for the degree of Ph.D, KDI School of Public Policy and Management, 2007.
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   Such a result demonstrates that financial strategy centering on 
membership fee and private donation could serve as an alternative strategy 
for sustainable growth amid aggravated conditions. In particular, as the 
importance of internal capacity to enlarge direct contacts and continuous 
communication with citizens grows, developing relevant programs to make it 
possible is deemed to be critical. Such strategy to enhance internal capacity 
is designed to secure necessary resources from citizens, recipients of 
NGOs’ activities, and stands in a stark contrast to the growth and financial 
strategy of the 1990s, which focused on creating amicable atmosphere via 
policy and publicity-related activities and raising considerable amount of 
fund from individuals or corporations which were at some distance from 
ordinary citizens, recipients of NGOs’ activities.
   Such strategy can be called substance-centered growth strategy from the 
viewpoint that it helps NGOs to concentrate on what they are supposed to 
do by removing the need to expand unnecessarily. It is getting more and 
more important to enrich the substance than to enlarge the size as time 
goes. 
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Location
 Regular Irregular
Total Male Female Total Male Female
ADVO
Seoul
Mean 18.45 8.14 10.32 2.00 .77 1.23
N 22 22 22 22 22 22
Std. Deviation 20.179 8.919 12.077 2.449 1.232 1.688
metropolitan
cities
Mean 5.60 2.90 2.70 1.20 .60 .60
N 30 30 30 30 30 30
Std. Deviation 5.256 3.556 2.277 2.987 1.429 1.714
other cities
Mean 3.36 1.24 2.11 .40 .29 .11
N 45 45 45 45 45 45
Std. Deviation 3.113 1.151 3.298 .720 .661 .383
Total
Mean 7.47 3.32 4.15 1.01 .49 .52
N 97 97 97 97 97 97
Std. Deviation 11.770 5.406 7.055 2.158 1.091 1.332
SVC
Seoul
Mean 15.25 9.75 5.50 1.00 .25 .75
N 4 4 4 4 4 4
Std. Deviation 8.578 5.909 3.317 1.155 .500 .957
metropolitan 
cities
Mean 30.17 6.17 24.00 7.67 3.00 4.67
N 6 6 6 6 6 6
Std. Deviation 31.391 9.368 29.732 9.852 4.817 6.250
other cities
Mean 16.31 4.38 11.92 1.69 .54 1.15
N 13 13 13 13 13 13
Std. Deviation 8.460 2.815 6.614 2.287 .877 1.819
Total
Mean 19.74 5.78 13.96 3.13 1.13 2.00
N 23 23 23 23 23 23
Std. Deviation 17.700 5.752 16.408 5.723 2.651 3.668
Total
Seoul
Mean 17.96 8.38 9.58 1.85 .69 1.15
N 26 26 26 26 26 26
Std. Deviation 18.769 8.448 11.268 2.310 1.158 1.592
metropolitan 
cities
Mean 9.69 3.44 6.25 2.28 1.00 1.28
N 36 36 36 36 36 36
Std. Deviation 15.807 4.954 13.978 5.219 2.414 3.221
other cities
Mean 6.26 1.95 4.31 .69 .34 .34
N 58 58 58 58 58 58
Std. Deviation 7.227 2.106 5.885 1.340 .715 1.001
Total
Mean 9.83 3.79 6.03 1.42 .62 .80
N 120 120 120 120 120 120
Std. Deviation 13.899 5.535 10.244 3.243 1.524 2.065
APPENDIX 3
3.1 The State of NGO-workers, 2002 (unit: won)
    - for all NGOs replied in 2002
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Location
 Regular Irregular
Total Male Female Total Male Female
ADVO
Seoul
Mean 21.61 9.39 12.22 2.11 .83 1.28
N 18 18 18 18 18 18
Std. Deviation 21.074 9.413 12.591 2.518 1.339 1.674
metropolitan 
cities
Mean 5.96 3.13 2.83 1.38 .67 .71
N 24 24 24 24 24 24
Std. Deviation 5.812 3.949 2.479 3.308 1.579 1.899
other cities
Mean 3.13 1.50 1.63 .42 .33 .08
N 24 24 24 24 24 24
Std. Deviation 1.541 1.142 1.610 .776 .761 .282
Total
Mean 9.20 4.24 4.95 1.23 .59 .64
N 66 66 66 66 66 66
Std. Deviation 13.752 6.303 8.058 2.492 1.265 1.505
SVC
Seoul
Mean 15.25 9.75 5.50 1.00 .25 .75
N 4 4 4 4 4 4
Std. Deviation 8.578 5.909 3.317 1.155 .500 .957
metropolitan 
cities
Mean 40.00 3.00 37.00 6.67 2.00 4.67
N 3 3 3 3 3 3
Std. Deviation 37.000 5.196 38.197 3.786 2.646 5.686
other cities
Mean 19.38 4.75 14.63 2.00 .63 1.38
N 8 8 8 8 8 8
Std. Deviation 7.909 2.866 5.854 2.673 1.061 2.134
Total
Mean 22.40 5.73 16.67 2.67 .80 1.87
N 15 15 15 15 15 15
Std. Deviation 18.134 4.713 18.829 3.222 1.424 3.044
Total
Seoul
Mean 20.45 9.45 11.00 1.91 .73 1.18
N 22 22 22 22 22 22
Std. Deviation 19.400 8.760 11.703 2.348 1.241 1.563
metropolitan 
cities
Mean 9.74 3.11 6.63 1.96 .81 1.15
N 27 27 27 27 27 27
Std. Deviation 15.939 3.984 15.408 3.695 1.711 2.699
other cities
Mean 7.19 2.31 4.88 .81 .41 .41
N 32 32 32 32 32 32
Std. Deviation 8.185 2.206 6.509 1.595 .837 1.188
Total
Mean 11.64 4.52 7.12 1.49 .63 .86
N 81 81 81 81 81 81
Std. Deviation 15.422 6.042 11.652 2.679 1.289 1.922
3.2 The State of NGO-workers, 2002 (unit: person)
    - for all NGOs replied in both 2002 and 2005
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Location
 Regular Irregular
Total Male Female Total Male Female
ADVO
Seoul
Mean 16.44 6.44 10.00 .61 .28 .33
N 18 18 18 18 18 18
Std. Deviation 11.898 5.575 7.388 .916 .669 .594
metropolitan 
cities
Mean 5.50 2.75 2.75 1.39 .43 .96
N 24 24 24 23 23 23
Std. Deviation 2.654 1.847 1.962 2.856 .788 2.345
other cities
Mean 3.50 1.50 2.00 .21 .13 .08
N 24 24 24 24 24 24
Std. Deviation 1.888 1.560 1.865 .509 .338 .282
Total
Mean 7.76 3.30 4.45 .74 .28 .46
N 66 66 66 65 65 65
Std. Deviation 8.381 3.774 5.356 1.839 .625 1.469
SVC
Seoul
Mean 14.75 9.50 5.25 1.25 .50 .75
N 4 4 4 4 4 4
Std. Deviation 9.979 7.416 2.630 .957 .577 .500
metropolitan 
cities
Mean 42.00 5.67 36.33 9.00 .33 8.67
N 3 3 3 3 3 3
Std. Deviation 42.532 4.509 38.371 6.557 .577 7.095
other cities
Mean 22.57 4.71 17.86 2.86 .29 2.57
N 7 7 7 7 7 7
Std. Deviation 13.011 2.870 10.761 3.671 .756 3.552
Total
Mean 24.50 6.29 18.21 3.71 .36 3.36
N 14 14 14 14 14 14
Std. Deviation 21.940 4.921 20.226 4.665 .633 4.749
Total
Seoul
Mean 16.14 7.00 9.14 .73 .32 .41
N 22 22 22 22 22 22
Std. Deviation 11.370 5.872 6.978 .935 .646 .590
metropolitan 
cities
Mean 9.56 3.07 6.48 2.27 .42 1.85
N 27 27 27 26 26 26
Std. Deviation 16.794 2.336 15.243 4.094 .758 3.896
other cities
Mean 7.81 2.23 5.58 .81 .16 .65
N 31 31 31 31 31 31
Std. Deviation 10.114 2.320 8.441 2.040 .454 1.924
Total
Mean 10.69 3.83 6.86 1.27 .29 .97
N 80 80 80 79 79 79
Std. Deviation 13.341 4.124 10.890 2.777 .623 2.602
3.3  The State of NGO-workers, 2005 (unit: person)
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LOC  Member 
-ship
Regula
r staffs
Total 
revenue
membership 
fee
Fundraising business 
program
project Advertise 
-ment
gov't 
support
break
up 
or
inner 
probl
em
ADVO
Mean 216.67 7.33 39533.33 18000.00 17066.67 3666.67 14333.33 .00 11466.67
N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
S. D 104.083 9.238 10032.613 7000.000 27669.719 3214.550 16921.387 .000 12265.942
SVC
Mean 1675.00 6.00 276200.00 124600.00 27750.00 .00 69150.00 26000.00 5250.00
N 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
S. D 1873.833 1.414 175079.639 123602.265 22980.970 .000 32314.780 36769.553 7424.621
Total
Mean 800.00 6.80 134200.00 60640.00 21340.00 2200.00 36260.00 10400.00 8980.00
N 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
S. D 1233.390 6.611 156578.670 85164.241 23432.413 3033.150 36134.305 23255.107 10030.055
No- 
resp
onse
ADVO
Mean 323.96 4.96 125143.48 30413.04 15617.39 34117.39 11373.91 1739.13 22347.83
N 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
S. D 318.784 5.653 146772.647 37677.583 15970.673 71681.535 13602.714 4564.860 48372.239
SVC
Mean 1283.64 8.27 346727.27 32818.18 56454.55 146727.27 49090.91 .00 30272.73
N 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
S. D 1746.266 14.907 732752.085 26577.502 86239.624 469877.876 85959.821 .000 54100.076
Total
Mean 634.44 6.03 196832.35 31191.18 28829.41 70550.00 23576.47 1176.47 24911.76
N 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
S. D 1095.215 9.546 433748.354 34084.515 52913.179 270535.662 51800.100 3817.588 49608.386
resp
onse
ADVO
Mean 703.75 7.19 247218.75 51500.00 23875.00 96040.63 20656.25 937.50 22666.67
N 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 30
S. D 871.135 8.185 311901.632 58452.076 47760.788 241762.456 25932.741 2513.672 61433.639
SVC
Mean 3791.47 14.73 573551.02 147826.53 110736.73 152377.55 87469.39 7755.10 23387.76
N 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49
S. D 7203.475 18.377 724439.975 206753.012 140066.577 437338.834 141291.676 28145.108 54989.323
Total
Mean 2571.63 11.75 444629.63 109771.60 76420.99 130120.99 61074.07 5061.73 23113.92
N 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 79
S. D 5808.192 15.568 615104.545 170930.615 120336.218 371720.550 115407.000 22112.975 57132.547
3.4  The State of Membership, Workers and Finance of NGOs, In 2002, 
     - classified by three categories; NGOs that was broken up or with inner 
       problems in 2005, NGOs that didn't answer the survey in 2005, and 
       NGOs that answered the survey in 2005.
(unit: person, thousand won)
